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REWRITING HISTORY: THE PROPRIETY OF




The power of courts to vacate their prior judgments is not a
recent innovation. In the past several years, however, courts have
begun to embrace the practice of vacating judgments following a
postjudgment settlement of the litigation.' The practice appears to
have its roots2 in the Second Circuit's decision in Nestle Co. v.
Chester's Market, Inc.3 While many practitioners seem unaware of the
availability of vacatur after judgment,4 the possibility of obtainiing
vacatur and the salutary effect of vacatur upon postjudgment settle-
ments is receiving increasing attention from the bar.5
t Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law; B.A. 1982, Cor-
nell University; J.D. 1985, Yale Law School. I am grateful to Debbie Batts, Lea
Brilmayer, Geoffrey Hazard, Bruce Johnson, Michael Malloy, Mike Martin, Richard P-s-
ner, and Steve Thel for reading and commenting on earlier drafts of this Article and to
Gary Leibowitz for his research assistance. In addition, I would like to thankJohn Cof-
fee for reminding me that civil procedure is too important to be left to proceduralists.
See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and
Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 877 (1987).
1 This Article will focus on three "primary" cases representing the three ap-
proaches recently employed by the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits in ruling on a
motion to vacate: National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Seafirst Corp., 891 F.2d 762 (9th Cir.
1989); Memorial Hosp. v. United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 862 F.2d 1299
(7th Cir. 1988); Nestle Co. v. Chester's Mkt., Inc., 756 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1985).
2 Nestle appears to be the first modem decision in which a court concluded that a
settling party was "entitled" to vacatur of an adverse trial court judgment. Prior to the
Nestle decision, the rule in the Second Circuit seems to have been to the contrary. See
Sampson v. Radio Corp. of Am., 434 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1970).
3 756 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1985).
4 Informal discussions with the Second Circuit officials in charge of the administra-
tion of the Civil Appeal Management Program (CAMP) indicate that most practitioners
are unaware of the Nestle decision and the possibility of avoiding adverse effects of a trial
court judgment through vacatur. It seems likely that the recent attention focused on
vacatur and its effects will result in an increased use of motions to vacate by litigants.
5 See Note, Settlement Pending Appeak An Argument For Vacatur, 58 FoRDHAM L. REv.
233 (1989) (authored by Henry E. Klingeman) [hereinafter Note, Settlement Pending Ap-
peal]; Note, Avoiding Issue Preclusion by Settlement Conditioned Upon the Vacatur of EnteredJudg-
ments, 96 YALE LJ. 860 (1987) (authored by William D. Zeller) [hereinafter Note,
Avoiding Issue Preclusion); Robert A. Barker, Collateral Estoppek Workers' Compensation,
N.Y.LJ., Apr. 23, 1990, at 3, col. 1; see also Note, The Impact of Collateral Estoppel on
Postjudgment Settlements, 15 Sw. U.L. REv. 343 (1985) (authored by Ann M. Ghazarians)
[hereinafter Note, The Impact of Collateral Estoppel].
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One explanation for this attention is the increasing congestion
of federal dockets, both at the trial and the appellate levels, which
has led courts to search for new ways to resolve disputes and reduce
the system's caseload. 6 The Nestle court and most commentators
view vacatur after settlement as a useful tool in encouraging settle-
ments and reducing appellate caseloads. 7
6 A number of proposals have given rise to discussion, experimentation, and pro-
cedural reform in an attempt to reduce the docket congestion of the federal courts. See,
e.g., Alan Betten, Institutional Reform in the Federal Courts, 52 IND. L.J. 63 (1976) (screening
procedures, use of per curiam opinions, adding judgeships or circuits); Irving R. Kauf-
man, The Pre-Argument Conference: An Appellate Procedural Reform, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1094
(1974) (experimental program of preargument conferences designed to encourage set-
tlement and narrow issues on appeal) [hereinafter Kaufman, The Pre-Argument Conference];
Richard A. Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods ofAlternative Dispute Resolution:
Some Cautionary Observances, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 366 (1986) (the summary jury trial as an
alternative to conventional litigation); William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, The
Non-Precedential Precedent-Limited Publication and No-Citation Rules in the United States Courts
of Appeals, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1167 (1978) (reducing opinion-writing through the use of
unpublished or limited publication opinions). The most highly publicized experimenta-
tion has been in the area of alternative dispute resolution (ADR). See Posner, supra, at
366 n.2 (citing ADR literature).
A significant procedural reform at the appellate level is the use of preargument
conferences to encourage settlement of cases pending appeal. The Second Circuit has
created a program known as the Civil Appeals Management Plan (CAMP) in which liti-
gants must participate in a pre-argument conference with staff counsel who play an af-
firmative role in encouraging settlement. See Irving R. Kaufman, Must Every Appeal Run
the Gamut?-The Civil Appeals Management Plan, 95 YALE L.J. 755, 758 (1986) [hereinafter
Kaufman, Must Every Appeal Run the Gamut?]. The Second Circuit claims that its CAMP
program has increased the number of cases which are settled pending appeal. See id. at
761; Irving R. Kaufman, New Remedies for the Next Century of Judicial Reform: Time as the
Greatest Innovator, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 253, 261-64 (1988); Kaufman, The Pre-Argument
Conference, supra, at 1098-1102. That conclusion has been strongly criticized by at least
one commentator, who claims that empirical evidence demonstrates that the CAMP pro-
gram does not have a statistically significant effect on settlement. See JERRY GOLDMAN,
INEFFECTIVE JUSTICE: EVALUATING THE PREAPPEAL CONFERENCE (1980).
The Second Circuit's program has lead to experimentation in other Circuits. Both
the Sixth and the Eighth Circuits have adopted programs modeled on CAMP, which are
designed to increase the efficiency of the appellate process. Both programs include as
an objective the encouragement of settlement. See Donald P. Lay, A Blueprint for Judicial
Management, 17 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1047, 1063 (1984) (Eighth Circuit program involves
"attempting to bring the lawyers together and having them meet at an early stage of the
appellate process in order to try to effect a settlement"); Robert W. Rack, Jr., Pre-Argu-
ment Conferences in the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, 15 U. TOL. L. REV. 921 (1984). The
Seventh Circuit experimented with a preappeal program from 1978 to 1983. The pro-
gram was found to have no significant effect on the rate of settlement of appeals. See
JERRY GOLDMAN, THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT PREAPPEAL PROGRAM: AN EVALUATION 43 (1982).
The Seventh Circuit subsequently discontinued its program. See Kaufman, Must Every
Appeal Run the Gamut?, supra, at 762 n.34. The Ninth Circuit has a prebriefing conference
program, but its program is designed for the purpose of case management, not encour-
aging settlement. See JOE S. CECIL, ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN A LARGE APPELLATE
COURT: THE NINTH CIRCUIT INNOVATIONS PROJECTS 81-82 (1985).
7 See Note, Settlement Pending Appeal, supra note 5, at 235-36 (observing the dramatic
increase in docket congestion in the federal courts and the responses by the legal com-
munity, which have included attempts at ADR and encouragement of settlements). Va-
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Although the courts recognize vacatur's salutary effect on set-
tlement, they remain cognizant that vacatur has its drawbacks. The
benefits that vacatur may present to a losing litigant are partially
offset by the detriments that erasing a valid judgment may have on
third parties or the public as a whole. When considering a motion
to vacate made in the context of a postjudgment settlement, the
courts have framed the analysis in terms of balancing the interests of
the public in the finality ofjudgments against the interests of private
litigants in ending the litigation through settlement.8 Two percep-
tions underlie the public interest in finality ofjudgments: the belief
that finality increases the efficiency of the judicial system by acting as
a bar to relitigation of the same and similar claims and issues, and
the opinion that finality increases the integrity of the system by
maintaining respect for the judicial process. 9 On the other hand,
proponents of vacatur argue that the function of litigation is the res-
olution of private disputes, and no public interest can outweigh the
private interests of the litigants in resolving their dispute.10 More-
over, the proponents argue that litigants should be entitled to abso-
lute control over the manner in which their dispute is resolved;" a
decision denying the parties' request for vacatur is thus an imper-
missible judicial interference with this right. 12
catur is frequently viewed as an important tool for encouraging parties to settle pending
appeal. See id.
8 To the extent that settlement has the effect of reducing docket congestion and
resolving cases without further consumption of judicial resources, it obviously serves
public as well as private interests. "Refusal to vacate may force parties to continue an
appeal, at cost to themselves, their adversaries, the overburdened appellate courts and,
by extension, the public." Note, Settlement Pending Appeal, supra note 5, at 236. ADR
advocates claim that settlement is preferable to full adjudication because resolution of
disputes through settlement conserves judicial resources. With programs such as
CAMP, the courts appear to espouse that view. For a critique of the proposition that
settlement is, in generic terms, preferable to judgment, see Owen M. Fiss, Against Settle-
ment, 93 YALE LJ. 1073 (1984).
9 For the last hundred years the Supreme Court has followed a course stressing
the importance of finality. See, e.g., Southern Pac. R.R. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 49
(1897) ("[The aid ofjudicial tribunals would not be invoked for the vindication of rights
of person and property, if ... conclusiveness did not attend the judgments of such
tribunals .... "). The Court's interest in promoting finality of judgments is most re-
cently evidenced by its expansion of the doctrines ofresjudicata and collateral estoppel.
See infra notes 115-38 and accompanying text.
10 See, e.g., Nestle, 756 F.2d at 282-83; Federal Data Corp. v. SMS Data Prods.
Group, Inc., 819 F.2d 277, 279-80 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
11 This model of litigation, in which the individual choices of the litigants reign
supreme, is often referred to as the traditional model of litigation. See Abram Chayes,
The Role of the Judge In Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1281, 1282-83 (1976)
(describing typical attributes of the traditional model). The prime importance of indi-
vidual litigants suggests that the model is really one of individual autonomy. SeeJohn E.
Kennedy, Digging for the Missing Link (Book Review), 41 VAND. L. REv. 1089, 1092-93
(1988).
12 See 13A CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FED-
1991]
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Recent decisions in the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits re-
flect three wholly different results in the balance of interests. The
Second Circuit approach, reflected in the Nestle decision, accepts the
importance of encouraging settlement and, accordingly, adopts a
rule of law in which settling litigants are entitled to vacatur of the
trial court's judgment virtually as a matter of right. The Seventh
Circuit concludes that the public interest in the finality ofjudgments
outweighs the parties' private interests and determines that motions
to vacate should generally be denied.13 The Ninth Circuit adopts a
case-by-case balancing approach in which the courts consider the
implications of the analysis on the specific facts of a particular
case. 14
This Article presents the basic question of whether and under
what circumstances a court should grant the parties' motion to va-
cate when a case is settled after a final judgment. The Article will
first examine in detail the approaches espoused by the Second, Sev-
enth, and Ninth Circuits. Second, it will consider the consequences
of vacatur, both upon the parties to the litigation and others. Third,
using an economic approach, it will assess the impact of vacatur on
the settlement process, and will conclude by considering the ques-
tion of whether postjudgment vacatur truly encourages settlement
and if so, at what cost.15
The Article reaches the conclusion that, while a decision such as
Nestle has the result of expediting the termination of litigation in a
particular case, a rule of law which routinely permits post-settlement
ERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3533.10, at 432 (2d ed. 1982) [hereinafter WIuHTrr,
MILLER & COOPER] ("The parties -should remain free to settle on terms that require
vacation of the judgment, entry of a new consent judgment, or such other action as fits
their needs.").
13 See Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d at 1299.
14 See National Union, 891 F.2d at 762.
15 A true advocate of the structuralist approach to litigation, such as Professor Fiss,
would further criticize postsettlement vacatur by arguing that the encouragement of set-
tlement of cases pending appeal is not a desirable goal. See Owen M. Fiss, Out of Eden, 94
YALE LJ. 1669 (1985) [hereinafter Fiss, Out of Eden]; Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court,
1978 Term-Forword: The Forms ofJustice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979) [hereinafter Fiss, The
Supreme Court]; Fiss, supra note 8. Professor Fiss argues that settlement furthers neither
the private goals of the litigants nor the public goals of society in the adjudicative pro-
cess. Moreover, Fiss replies to those who commend settlement for its conservation of
judicial resources that settlement does not actually resolve disputes; rather, it is merely a
truce. See Fiss, Out of Eden, supra, at 1670. As such, it is "a highly problematic technique
for streamlining dockets." Fiss, supra note 8, at 1075. Professor Fiss may somewhat
overstate his case. Presumably rational litigants would not settle cases unless settlement
served their private goals, at least to some extent. Moreover, it is readily apparent that
settlement serves the public goal of maintaining the judicial system's capacity to resolve
disputes. If no cases were settled, the courts would surely collapse. A detailed explora-
tion of the merits of resolving litigation by settlement is beyond the scope of this Article,
which is limited to the effect of vacatur on the settlement process.
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vacatur ofjudgments actually distorts the settlement process. Such
a rule may encourage litigants to delay settlement until a later stage
in the litigation. This delay results in a waste of judicial resources.
Further, the effect of vacatur on the litigation process extends be-
yond judicial waste; it perverts the judicial decision into a negotiable
commodity, engendering distortion of, and disrespect for, the role
of the courts.
!
THE MOTION TO VACATE
A. The Decision of the Litigants to Vacate: Settlement of
Cases After Judgment
Following an adverse judgment at the trial level, an unsuccess-
ful litigant incurs real economic costs-the costs of complying with
the imposed remedy. 16 That remedy may require the losing party to
pay money damages, comply with an injunction, or alter his or her
conduct pursuant to the court's declaration of the parties' legal
rights. The losing litigant may also incur costs which extend beyond
the judgment itself, costs which will be referred to as "collateral
costs."'' 7 Collateral costs may include the adverse publicity engen-
dered by the decision, damage to reputation,'8 and the spawning of
parasite lawsuits, such as copycat or class action claims. Moreover,
the court's findings of fact and law may themselves have a life be-
yond the instant case which creates additional costs. Modem doc-
trines of claim and issue preclusion have expanded the use of
judicial findings in subsequent litigation against the losing party.'
9
16 Or, in the case of a losing plaintiff, the cost of not obtaining the remedy sought.
17 The notion that an adverse judgment may have collateral consequences which
extend beyond the ad damnum is not original to this Article. Indeed, the collateral conse-
quences of criminal cases have given rise to a doctrine which provides that such cases
will not be deemed moot even after the defendant has served the entire sentence, in
order that the case may be reviewed on appeal. Under the doctrine, the defendant, if
successful, may be relieved of the collateral consequences of the conviction. See Sibron
v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 50-58 (1968) (noting collateral consequences of an adverse
criminal judgment including future sentence enhancement and impeachment).
18 Indeed, an adverse decision in a civil securities litigation may require the litigant
to disclose the adverse judgment to the SEC and the public. See, e.g., Instructions to
SEC Schedule 13D, Item 2(e), 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13d-101 (1990) (requiring reporting of
whether the filer is subject to ajudgment enjoining future violations or finding any viola-
tion with respect to federal or state securities laws).
19 See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 317-27
(1971) (tracing expansion and development of preclusion doctrines). In Bernhard v.
Bank of America National Trust & Savings Association, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892
(1942), the California Supreme Court repudiated the traditional requirement that issue
preclusion involve only the parties to the original lawsuit. The Bernhard decision to abol-
ish the requirement of mutuality was widely followed, although not until relatively re-
cently. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979); Brainerd Currie,
Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REV. 281 (1957).
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The collateral costs of a judgment may be substantially greater for
the losing party than the immediate costs of complying with the
judgment. 2
0
Faced with the prospect of incurring such costs, the unsuccess-
ful litigant has three options: to comply with the judgment, to ap-
peal, or to negotiate a settlement with his or her adversary. The
expected legal and economic consequences of each option are likely
to influence the litigant's choice.2'
A litigant who complies with the adverse judgment must bear
the above-described costs of the judgment in full. In addition, com-
pliance with the judgment terminates the litigation by effectively
mooting the controversy. A complying litigant thereby forgoes any
right to appeal.22
A litigant who successfully appeals may avoid any liability to the
other side. The terms of the trial court judgment may, however,
make a successful appeal unlikely. For example, appeal of a judg-
ment based solely on unreviewable findings of fact 23 is likely to be
20 For example, the judgment in Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 493
F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974), an early asbestos case, was
for $58,534.04 in damages. Id. at 1102. (The jury verdict was for $68,000, which was
adjusted, probably to account for prejudgment interest and amounts received from set-
tling defendants. See Michael D. Green, The Inability of Offensive Collateral Estoppel to Fufill
Its Promise: An Examination of Estoppel in Asbestos Litigation, 70 IowA L. REv. 141, 171 n. 179
(1984)). Many subsequent asbestos litigants have attempted to use the Borel opinion to
collaterally estop defendants from denying that asbestos is an unreasonably dangerous
product. See Green, supra, at 172-78. These subsequent cases have cost defendants bil-
lions of dollars in compensation and litigation expenses. Id at 171. Thus, for future
asbestos defendants, the cost of the Boreljudgment may extend far beyond the $58,000
money damages.
21 Scholars have long accepted that parties base litigation decisions on the expected
economic consequences of those decisions. Professor Gould, Landes, and Posner have
analyzed the decision to litigate or settle a civil lawsuit in terms of an investment deci-
sion, in which the litigant weighs continued participation in the litigation in terms of the
expected value to be obtained by such participation against the costs of continuing to
litigate. See John P. Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2J. LEGAL S-ruD. 279 (1973);
William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14J.L. & ECON. 61 (1971); Richard
Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STuD.
399 (1973). Subsequent commentators have attempted to refine the model of the "liti-
gation investment" in order to reflect more accurately the decisionmaking during the
ongoing litigation process. See, e.g., Bradford Cornell, The Incentive to Sue: An Option-
Pricing Approach, 19J. LEGAL S-UD. 173 (1990). For an application of the economic "liti-
gation investment" model to the settlement of cases afterjudgment, see infra notes 220-
31 and accompanying text.
22 A party's compliance with the adverse judgment will render the action moot. See,
e.g., United States v. Garde, 848 F.2d 1307, 1310 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
23 In general, findings of fact by a trial court may only be reversed by an appellate
court on the conclusion that such findings are clearly erroneous. See FED. R. Civ. P.
52(a); see also Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 286 n.16 (1982) (condemning
appellate court practice of subjecting trial court factfinding to more extensive scrutiny
through procedure of terming certain facts "ultimate facts"). The Supreme Court re-
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futile. 24 In addition, the appellate process is statistically unlikely to
result in reversal; records from the federal courts reveal that most
judgments are upheld on appeal.25 Moreover, the decision of the
trial court, by demonstrating the court's perception of the applica-
ble law and the application of that law to the facts, may bring home
to the unsuccessful litigant the lack of legal merit in his or her legal
position.
Such factors often lead to the third available option: settle-
ment. Parties settle a large number of cases during the appellate
process and prior to the completion of appellate review.26 Though
the loser is unlikely to escape all costs of the judgment by settle-
ment, the costs of settlement are unlikely to exceed those of comply-
ing with the judgment. And by offering the winner a swifter and
more certain route to payment than the appellate process, a losing
litigant may be able to negotiate a considerable savings through
postjudgment settlement.27
The settlement process offers the losing litigant an additional
benefit. If the losing party is concerned about the collateral conse-
quences of the adverse judgment, he or she may incorporate certain
conditions into the settlement agreement to deal with those conse-
quences. These conditions may include dismissing the action predi-
cated on a consent agreement disclaiming liability, limiting the
cently expounded on what is meant by "clearly erroneous" in Anderson v. City of Besse-
mer, 470 U.S. 564, 573-76 (1984).
24 Cf Martin B. Louis, Allocating Adjudicative Decision Making Authority Between the Trial
and Appellate Levels: A Unified View of the Scope of Review, the Judge/Jury Question, and Proce-
dural Discretion, 64 N.C.L. REV. 993 (1986).
25 See Harlon Leigh Dalton, Taking The Right to Appeal (More or Less) Seriously, 95 YALE
L.J. 62, 78 (1985) (appellate courts affirm more often than they reverse). Studies of the
case statistics in federal courts of appeals indicate that the typical overall reversal rate is
less than 20%. See, e.g., DIRECTOR OF THE ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, ANNUAL RE-
PORT app. I, Detailed Statistical Tables, at 10, table B-5 (June 30, 1989) (overall percentage
of cases reversed by federal Courts of Appeals was 13.3%; percentage of private civil
cases reversed was 16.1%); ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL
COURT MANAGEMENT STATISTICS (1984) (showing overall reversal rates in the United
States Courts of Appeals during the period 1979 through 1984 as ranging between
15.9% and 17.7%); see also Note, Courting Reversal: The Supervisory Role of State Supreme
Courts, 87 YALE LJ. 1191, 1198 n.30 (1978) (authored by Margaret P.P. Mason) (citing
empirical study of 16 state supreme courts for the period 1870-1970 and concluding
that the aggregate reversal rate was 38.5%).
26 See Peter H. Schuck, The Role of Judges in Settling Complex Cases: The Agent Orange
Example, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 337 (1986) (the failure to reach settlement is frequently
based on parties' inability to assess the legal merits of their position).
27 Like simple compliance, settlement renders a case moot. Under such circum-
stances, "the trial court's determinations ought to have the same conclusive effect that
they would have if the appellant had not appealed at all." Garde, 848 F.2d at 1310 n.7.
This Article questions whether, in the context of a settlement, the lower court's opinion
should be treated differently than when a party simply pays the judgment without
appealing.
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collateral use of the adverse judgment inter se, or between the par-
ties, or stipulating that the parties will request the court to vacate
the adverse judgment.
Vacatur is potentially the most powerful of these options. Vaca-
tur enables an unsuccessful litigant to obtain the collateral benefits
of reversal, such as removal of the decision from the record books
and destruction of any collateral estoppel or res judicata conse-
quences, in exchange for the settlement price.28 In effect, if a liti-
gant is certain that the court will subsequently vacate an adverse
judgment, the availability of vacatur makes going to trial cost-free, 29
apart from litigation costs.8 0 A litigant may roll the dice, gamble on
a favorable judgment and, if unsuccessful at trial, settle the case af-
ter judgment and move for vacatur. After settlement and vacatur of
the trial court decision, the litigant will be no worse off than if he or
she had avoided a final judgment by entering into a pretrial
settlement.
B. The Authority of Courts to Vacate Judgments
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide the federal
courts,3 1 at both the trial and appellate levels, with explicit authority
to modify prior judgments. An example of such authority is found
in Rule 60(b),3 2 which permits a court to relieve a party from an
adverse judgment on grounds which include fraud, mistake, newly
discovered evidence, and satisfaction of the judgment.33
28 In a strict sense vacatur may refer to removal of the adverse judgment, with-
drawal of the court's opinion, or both. The consequences of vacating only the adverse
judgment are more limited. Though a vacated judgment has no preclusive effect, see
infra notes 144-45 and accompanying text, the court's opinion may still be used to guide
the decisions of subsequent courts. This distinction is particularly important when con-
sidering the vacatur of appellate court decisions.
29 This assertion is based on the assumption that an unsuccessful litigant will have
to pay compensation costs whether he settles or litigates. Obviously a trial court judg-
ment may change the figure for which the litigant will be able to settle-that figure may
be higher or lower than the other side's original settlement demands, depending on
whether that party's original estimate of the expected judgment was accurate. See infra
notes 229-31 and accompanying text.
30 The additional litigation costs incurred by postponing settlement until after a
trial court judgment may, of course, be considerable, particularly if that judgment is
based on a full jury trial verdict.
31 This Article will focus on the procedures in the federal courts. Although the
policies and purposes of motions to vacate are the same in the state systems, the applica-
ble procedures may vary.
32 Rule 60(b) permits a court to relieve a party from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding on motion and upon such terms as are just, for a series of enumerated rea-
sons. The Rule also includes a catch-all provision which allows relief from a judgment
for "any other reason justifying relief from the operation of thejudgment." FED. R. Civ.
P. 60(b).
33 A litigant may also bring a motion to vacate under Rule 59(e) which permits
motions to alter or amend a judgment. See, e.g., Wisconsin Truck Center, Inc. v. Volvo
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Vacatur requires an affirmative action by the court-dismissal
or abandonment of a case does not automatically vacate the judg-
ment therein. 4 If a case undergoes appellate review or if the litiga-
tion is simply discontinued, the prior judgment continues to exist
and to have full force and effect. 5 By contrast, a vacated decision
has no further force and effect; 36 rather, vacatur operates to erase
the prior decision and requires affirmative judicial action.
While cases may be vacated for a variety of reasons, this Article
is concerned only with motions to vacate made in connection with
the postjudgment settlement of an action. In the type of action to
which this Article is addressed, the case has been litigated at the trial
court level to the point of a final3 7 decision38 and the entry ofjudg-
White Truck Corp., 692 F. Supp. 1010 (W.D. Wis. 1988) (motion to vacate based on
constitutional and other objections to judgment brought under FED. R. Civ. P. 59(e)).
Additionally, 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1988), which applies to both the Circuit Courts of
Appeal and the United States Supreme Court, provides:
The Supreme Court or any other court of appellate jurisdiction may af-
firm, modify, vacate, set aside or reverse any judgment, decree, or order
of a court lawfully brought before it for review, and may remand the
cause and direct the entry of such appropriate judgment, decree, or or-
der, or require such further proceedings to be had as may be just under
the circumstances.
34 See, e.g., Sup. CT. R. 53 (when a case before the court is settled, it is dismissed,
but not vacated). Although vacatur requires court action, dismissal of a lawsuit may
generally be accomplished without the action of the court. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P.
41 (a)(1) (an action may be dismissed without order of the court by the filing of a stipula-
tion of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared in the action).
35 See 1BJAMES WM. MOORE, Jo DESHA LucAs & THOMAS S. CURRICK, MOORE's FED-
ERAL PRACTICE 0.41613] (2d ed. 1988) [hereinafter MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE] (a final
judgment retains its preclusive effect regardless of the possibility or pendency of an
appeal).
36 See, e.g., Chandler v. System Council U-19, No. CV85-AR-1948-s, slip op. at 4
(N.D. Ala. Oct. 20, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) ("A decision which is vacated
has no precedential value, and for all intents and purposes never existed.").
37 Pending cases are also frequently settled after a variety of preliminary decisions
by the district court. These interim decisions may take the form of a partial grant of
summary judgment, a grant of interim relief in the form of a preliminary injunction, or a
dismissal of some portion of the pending claims. Like final judgments, these preliminary
decisions may involve findings of fact and/or findings of law. Similarly, litigants fre-
quently make analogous motions in these cases, requesting that the district court judge
vacate his or her prior decision(s). See, e.g., United States v. Gordon, 1987 Ct. Intl.
Trade LEXIS 31 (1987). Although a compelling argument can be made for the claim
that such preliminary decisions lack the intended permanence of final judgments and
should be routinely vacated, this Article asserts that interim decisions can be subjected
to the same analysis, and treated the same way, as final judgments. Moreover, the prac-
tice of routinely granting "[r]equests to vacate interlocutory opinions and orders in dis-
missed cases invite[s] a waste ofjudicial resources." Id., 1987 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS at 3
(refusing to vacate decision and order which did not constitute final judgment).
38 A final judgment may be based on a decision by judge orjury at trial, the grant of
a motion for summary judgment, or a successful motion to dismiss (e.g., dismissal based
on ajudicial finding that the court lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendant). The
decision upon which thejudgment is based may have required the court or jury to make
findings of fact, findings of law, or both.
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ment. Typically one or both parties have filed a notice of appeal,
thereby initiating the process of appellate review.39 Prior to com-
pletion of the appellate process, however, the parties may negotiate
a settlement which obviates the need for further litigation.
Postjudgment settlement necessarily entails dismissal of the
pending appeal(s). 40 A settlement does not mandate vacatur, how-
ever. Indeed, the vast majority of cases settled pending appeal do
not result in vacatur of the trial court's judgment. Although the par-
ties may explicitly address the issue of vacatur in the settlement
agreement,41 they need not do so in order to move for vacatur. 42
The motion to vacate, in the first instance, is most commonly
39 Although the parties need not have initiated the appellate process, only a settle-
ment effected prior to the final date upon which the losing party can challenge the judg-
ment, either by a motion directed to the trial court or by appeal, raises the issue of
vacatur. Once a party's time to appeal has run, there is no justification for vacatur-
settlement at that point in the litigation is equivalent to simple compliance with the
judgment. See supra note 27.
40 Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 42(a) provides that, if an appeal has not yet
been docketed, the case may be dismissed by the district court "upon the filing in that
court of a stipulation for dismissal signed by all the parties, or upon motion and notice
by the appellant." FED. R. App. P. 42(a). If the appeal has been docketed, the parties
thereto can have the case dismissed under Rule 42(b) by filing a stipulation of dismissal
with the clerk. Even if the parties do not so stipulate, the acceptance by both parties of
the settlement renders the action moot, and an appellate court will not retain jurisdic-
tion. See, e.g., United States v. Garde, 848 F.2d 1307, 1307 (D.C. Cir. 1988); cf Village
Escrow Co. v. National Union Fire Ins., 202 Cal. App. 3d 1309, 248 Cal. Rptr. 687, 694
(1988) (refusing to dismiss appeal settled after oral argument because of the great im-
portance of the issue presented and the timing and nature of the settlement). The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court, in denying review of Village Escrow, "ordered that the opinion be
not officially published." Id., 248 Cal. Rptr. at 687 n.*.
41 When negotiating the issue of vacatur, the parties have several options. The
most stringent condition that may be imposed by the losing party for the settlement to
become effective is that the judgment be vacated. In other words, the losing party only
agrees to a settlement conditioned on the court's grant of the subsequent motion to
vacate. Alternatively, the settlement agreement, though not conditioned on vacatur,
may require that the winning party join in the motion to vacate. Finally, the agreement
may simply require that the winning litigant agree not to oppose the loser's motion to
vacate the judgment.
Distinguishing between these options has some superficial appeal for courts strug-
gling with the propriety of vacatur. A settlement conditioned on vacatur, for example,
will be thwarted by denial of the motion to vacate, whereas an unconditional settlement
will remain in effect. The agreement by both parties to join in the motion to vacate may
affect the mootness analysis. Cf National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Seafirst Corp., 891 F.2d
762, 767 (9th Cir. 1989) (rejecting unilateral/bilateral distinction). This Article argues
that judicial consideration of these three scenarios should be identical. See infra notes
243-46 and accompanying text.
42 The motion to vacate may be made jointly, or by the losing party with the win-
ning party failing to object. A nonparty, however, cannot maintain a motion to vacate a
judgment. See, e.g., Citibank Int'l v. Collier-Traino, Inc., 809 F.2d 1438, 1440-41 (9th
Cir. 1987) (analogizing to a nonparty's attempt to appeal from a trial court judgment
and applying similar standards to motions by a nonparty to vacate).
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made to the appellate court,43 because once the notice of appeal has
been filed, the trial court is divested ofjurisdiction.44 If the appeal
has not yet been filed, the motion to vacate may be made directly to
the lower court.45 The Second Circuit has suggested that even in
cases in which an appeal has been filed, it is appropriate for the dis-
trict court to consider the motion to vacate first.4 6 Whichever court
considers the motion must decide the propriety of erasing a prior
judicial decision.
II
JUDICIAL CONSIDERATION OF THE MOTION TO VACATE
There is no direct statutory test governing the court's authority
to vacate a priorjudgment. Although the power of a court to vacate
a prior judgment is not explicit, 47 courts undisputably possess such
power, and the decision to vacate is a matter ofjudicial discretion.48
Moreover, the case law interpreting Rule 60(b) suggests that court
discretion in this area is quite broad.
49
In the first cases to address the issue of postsettlement motions
to vacate, litigants attempted to argue that vacatur of a judgment
43 See National Union, 891 F.2d at 765 ("The question of vacatur usually arises on
motion to the appellate court, made after a settlement, pending appeal.").
44 Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982) (per curiam)
("The filing of a notice of appeal is an event of jurisdictional significance-it confers
jurisdiction on the court of appeals and divests the district court of its control over those
aspects of the case involved in the appeal.").
45 See, e.g., National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Seafirst Corp., No. C85-396R (W.D.
Wash. 1987).
46 See Nestle Co. v. Chester's Mkt., Inc., 756 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1985). The appellate
court can return jurisdiction to the lower court by dismissing the appeal without preju-
dice. Such a practice seems eminently desirable. It is entirely appropriate for the court
which entered the underlying judgment to consider the motion to vacate because that
tribunal is most familiar with the relevant factors, including the parties involved, the
consequences of retaining the judgment, and whether the parties have had a full oppor-
tunity to litigate the issues.
47 Compare Nestle Co. v. Chester's Mkt., Inc., 596 F. Supp. 1445, 1449 (D. Conn.
1984) (motion for vacatur after settlement properly brought under FED. R. Civ. P.
60(b)(5) or (6)), rev'd on other grounds, 756 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1985) with Federal Data
Corp. v. SMS Data Prods. Group, Inc., 819 F.2d 277, 279 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (brought as
joint motion for dismissal conditioned on vacatur).
48 See National Union, 891 F.2d at 765 ("[W]e review for abuse of discretion."); Me-
morial Hosp. v. United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 862 F.2d 1299, 1302
(7th Cir. 1988) (in reviewing motion to vacate, court must "ensure that the agreement is
an appropriate commitment ofjudicial time and complies with legal norms"); Nestle, 756
F.2d at 282 ("Our inquiry ... is limited to whether the district court abused its
discretion").
49 See Nestle, 596 F. Supp. at 1449-50; see also Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S.
601, 614-15 (1949) ("In simple English, the language of the "other reason" clause [FED.
R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6)], for all reasons except the five particularly specified, vests power in
courts adequate to enable them to vacate judgments whenever such action is appropri-
ate to accomplish justice.").
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after settlement is mandatory.50 The argument was that the settle-
ment of the action renders the case moot.5 1 Under the doctrine of
United States v. Munsingwear, Inc. ,52 the litigants argued that a court is
required to vacate a case which has been mooted prior to comple-
tion of the appellate process. 55
In Munsingwear, the United States asked the Supreme Court to
hold that the doctrine of res judicata did not apply to a second suit
between the United States and Munsingwear. The first action by the
United States, alleging violations of a price-fixing regulation, had
been litigated with respect to injunctive relief only. Following a
judgment that Munsingwear's pricing had complied with the regula-
tion, the commodity involved was deregulated. Munsingwear
moved for dismissal on the basis of mootness, and the court of ap-
peals dismissed the appeal on that ground without vacating the
judgment. The United States then initiated a second lawsuit, cover-
ing a later time period, seeking treble damages. Munsingwear
moved to dismiss, based on the res judicata effect of the first action.
The United States argued that, since the first case had become moot
prior to appeal, the doctrine of res judicata should not apply.
The Supreme Court disagreed. The Court noted that where a
party is prevented from obtaining appellate review through no fault
of its own, it has been unfairly prejudiced, and res judicata should
not apply. Indeed, the Court referred to its regular practice of va-
cating judgments in cases which become moot on their way to the
Supreme Court.54 But the Court, finding that the United States ac-
quiesced in the dismissal of the initial action when it should have
attempted to preserve its rights by moving for vacatur, held that
"having slept on its rights," 55 the United States could not complain
that it was now prejudiced by the application of res judicata.
Munsingwear teaches that when a case is mooted through no
fault of the parties,56 the maintenance of the judgment may be prej-
50 See, e.g., National Union, 891 F.2d at 765; Nestle, 756 F.2d at 281; Ringsby Truck
Lines, Inc. v. Western Conference of Teamsters, 686 F.2d 720, 721-22 (9th Cir. 1982).
51 See cases cited supra note 50.
52 340 U.S. 36 (1950).
53 See Great Western Sugar Co. v. Nelson, 442 U.S. 92, 93 (1979); Duke Power Co.
v. Greenwood County, 299 U.S. 259, 267 (1936).
54 According to the Munsingwear Court:
The established practice of the Court in dealing with a civil case from a
court in the federal system which has become moot while on its way here
or pending our decision on the merits is to reverse or vacate the judg-
ment below and remand with a direction to dismiss.
Munsingwear, 340 U.S. at 39.
55 Id. at 41.
56 The Nestle court stated that the Munsingwear rule provides that "district court
judgments that become moot pending appeal must be vacated." Nestle, 756 F.2d at 281.
This reading of Munsingwear is far too broad.
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udicial to a party who has lost the opportunity to challenge such a
judgment on appeal. In such circumstances, "the judgment in a
moot case should be vacated to relieve the parties of collateral con-
sequences when they were unable to obtain appellate review."
57
The justification for this holding is the reluctance of the Court to
bind a party based on a prior judgment when that party has been
foreclosed from challenging that judgment on appeal.58 Thus, the
Munsingwear doctrine "clears the path for future relitigation of the
issues between the parties and eliminates a judgment, review of
which was prevented through happenstance. "5 9
Virtually all courts have refused to apply the Munsingwear doc-
trine to cases which have been settled.60 According to the courts,
Munsingwear does not apply to a voluntary decision to terminate the
litigation but rather to a situation in which, through no fault of the
losing party, it has lost the opportunity to appeal the adverse deci-
sion. Such a situation is readily distinguished from a settlement in
which the decision to forgo an appeal is voluntary.
6 '
For example, in Karcher v. May,6 2 a case rendered moot by the
conduct of a party, the Supreme Court rejected the suggestion that
Munsingwear required the case to be vacated. In Karcher, the appel-
lants were legislative officers who, after unsuccessfully defending
the constitutionality of a statute in the lower courts, lost their legis-
lative positions. The new legislators dropped the appeal-effec-
tively accepting the judgment entered by the lower court as if no
appeal had been taken.63 Appellants then sought to have the judg-
ment vacated. The Supreme Court refused. "This controversy did
not become moot due to circumstances unattributable to any of the
parties .... Accordingly, the Munsingwear procedure is inapplica-
ble... ."r4 The Supreme Court therefore allowed the judgment of
57 Memorial Hosp. v. United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 862 F.2d
1299, 1301 (7th Cir. 1988).
58 Munsingwear, 340 U.S. at 40.
59 Id.
60 See, e.g., Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d at 1301; Nestl, 756 F.2d at 282; Ringsby Truck
Lines, Inc. v. Western Conference of Teamsters, 686 F.2d 720, 721-22 (9th Cir. 1982).
But see Kennedy v. Block, 784 F.2d 1220 (4th Cir. 1986) (vacating as moot under Mun-
singwear doctrine judgment of district court where parties settled after the trial court's
decision).
61 See United States v. Garde, 848 F.2d 1307, 1311 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("mT1he
primary objective behind vacating a lower court opinion [avoiding prejudice to an appel-
lant who has been precluded from obtaining review] would be distorted if a party were
allowed to render deliberately a judgment unreviewable by its own action.").
62 484 U.S. 72 (1987).
63 Appellants attempted to continue to litigate the case in their individual capaci-
ties, but the court held that the real party in interest was the NewJersey Legislature and
dismissed the action. Id at 80-81.
64 Id at 83.
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the district court to stand.
Courts have applied the same reasoning to cases settled while
an appeal is pending. As the Ninth Circuit stated in Ringsby Truck
Lines v. Western Conference of Teamsters: "We find the distinction be-
tween litigants who are and are not responsible for rendering their
case moot at the appellate level persuasive." 65 The court explained
that if courts were to equate postjudgment settlement with moot-
ness then any litigant dissatisfied with a court's decision could, by
destroying his right of appeal, simply wipe that decision from the
books.6
6
Moreover, in the case of an unconditional settlement, a finding
that the controversy is moot does not justify vacatur. The case is no
more moot than in any other circumstance in which a party chooses
to abandon its claim or to forgo an appeal. 67 When settlement is
conditioned on vacatur, there is no mootness. If the court refuses to
vacate the judgment, the settlement does not take effect, and the
case continues. Under such circumstances, there is a live case or
controversy.
68
If the Munsingwear rule does not apply, a court has discretion to
vacate. The circuit courts have taken three different approaches re-
garding the exercise of this discretion. The first approach is that
espoused by the Second Circuit in Nestle Co. v. Chester's Market, Inc. 69
In Nestle, the Nestle Company sued the defendants alleging that de-
fendants' use of the term "toll house" constituted trademark in-
fringement. The trial court granted defendants' motion for partial
summary judgment, holding that "toll house" was a generic term
and thus could not be a trademark. While Nestle's appeal was pend-
ing, the parties settled both the trademark infringement claim and
all other pending claims and counterclaims. 70 Because Nestle
wanted to continue to claim that the use of the term "toll house"
constituted trademark infringement, the parties jointly moved the
court to vacate the district court's judgment. The settlement was
conditional and would proceed only if the court granted the parties'
65 Ringsby, 686 F.2d at 721.
66 Id
67 See, e.g., Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d at 1301: ("A settlement while the case is on
appeal is a reason why the losing party no longer wants the judgment reversed. The
case is neither more nor less moot than it would be if the loser were satisfied with the
judgment and complied without appealing.").
68 See Nestle Co. v. Chester's Mkt., Inc., 756 F.2d 280, 281 (2d Cir. 1985); Ringsby,
686 F.2d at 721-22.
69 756 F.2d 280.
70 The case was settled during the parties' pre-argument conference with staff
counsel for the Second Circuit pursuant to the Second Circuit's CAMP procedure. Nes-
tle Co. v. Chester's Mkt., Inc., 596 F. Supp. 1445, 1446 (D. Conn. 1984).
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motion to vacate. 71
The district court denied the parties' motion to vacate, finding:
1) that the case was not moot; 2) that the decision to vacate the
judgment was discretionary; and 3) that the public interests in favor
of finality of judgments and in adjudicating trademark validity out-
weighed the parties' interests in settlement.72 The parties then
made their motion to the Second Circuit. The Second Circuit re-
versed the decision, finding that the trial court had "abused its dis-
cretion."73 The appellate court essentially conducted the same sort
of balancing test that the trial court used, but concluded that the
trial court's reliance on the public interest in finality of judgments
was misplaced. Moreover, the court concluded that the importance
of promoting settlement superseded any interest in finality.74
Nestle illustrates the federal courts' strong policy 75 of encourag-
ing settlement. 76 The court in Nestle observed that refusal to vacate
the judgment in a case in which settlement is conditioned on vacatur
would not only cause the parties to expend additional time and re-
sources, but would force litigants willing to settle to submit to con-
tinued litigation.77 "We see no justification to force these
71 Id. (quoting Affidavit of Barry Garfinkel, Attorney for Defendant Saccone's Toll
House, 7).
72 The district court considered its ruling to be discretionary under Rule 60(b).
Further, the lower court noted that the Second Circuit had previously affirmed a denial
of a Rule 60(b) motion that the parties made after settlement to avoid the collateral
estoppel effects of the decision. Id. at 1450 n.6 (citing $ampson v. Radio Corp. of Am.,
434 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1970)).
73 Nestle, 756 F.2d at 284.
74 The Second Circuit made no attempt to distinguish or to reverse its previous
decision in Sampson, 434 F.2d 315, in which it had rejected the notion that a party could
use a motion to vacate under Rule 60(b) to avoid the adverse consequences of a settle-
ment decision. See also Cover v. Schwartz, 133 F.2d 541, 546-47 (2d Cir. 1942) (holding
that dismissal of a suit, as distinguished from dismissal of an appeal, should not be auto-
matic when a case is settled or compromised while on appeal), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 748
(1943).
75 See WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 12, § 3533.10, at 431-32 (advocating
the absolute right of the parties to settle on terms that include vacatur, based on "[a]ll of
the policies that make voluntary settlement so important a means of concluding litiga-
tion"); see also Federal Data Corp. v. SMS Data Prods. Group, Inc., 819 F.2d 277 (Fed.
Cir. 1987) (following Nestle based on the strong policy of the courts in favor of voluntary
settlements).
76 Critics have suggested that the Nestle decision stemmed from the Second Cir-
cuit's desire to uphold a settlement which had been arranged through the CAMP pro-
cess and that the Second Circuit's infatuation with the CAMP procedure motivated its
decision more than the general goal of encouraging settlement. See Mary A. Donovan &
Marya Lenn Yee, Letting The Chips Fall: The Second Circuit's Decision on Toll House, 52
BROOKLYN L. REv. 1029, 1030-31 (1986).
77 The Second Circuit's recent decision in Long Island Lighting Co. v. Cuomo, 888
F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1989), somewhat undermines Nestle's reliance on encouraging settle-
ment as ajustification for its decision. In Cuomo, the Second Circuit considered the ap-
plication of Nestle to a case which had been settled while on appeal, but in which the
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defendants, who wish only to settle the present litigation, to act as
unwilling private attorneys general and to bear the various costs and
risks of litigation."
78
Writing for the Seventh Circuit, Judge Easterbrook forcefully
rejected the Nestle approach. In Memorial Hospital v. United States De-
partment of Health & Human Seroices,79 the court held that the Seventh
Circuit should, as a general rule, refuse requests to vacate.80 Judge
Easterbrook opined that a judicial decision is a public act which pri-
vate agreements cannot and should not erase.81 The court further
noted that there are many circumstances in which parties decide to
forgo the right to appellate review, but that such a decision does not
require the court "reflexively" to vacate the judgment.82
The Memorial Hospital court also disagreed with the Second Cir-
cuit's analysis of the effect of vacatur on settlement. It noted that a
court is under an obligation to bring independent judgment to a
decision in which it is required to act. By automatically complying
with the wishes of the settling parties, the court risks becoming a
settlement agreement was not conditioned on vacatur (i.e., the agreement did not explic-
itly address the issue of vacatur). Id. at 233-34.
The trial court's decision in Cuomo was a comprehensive 56-page opinion that in-
cluded, inter alia, consideration of the plaintiff's constitutional challenges to two state
statutes, the "Used and Useful Act," N.Y. PUB. Aum. LAw § 66(24) (McKinney 1989),
and the "LIPA Act," N.Y. PUB. Atmr. LAw §§ 1020 to 1020-hh (McKinney 1989). The
court upheld the LIPA Act against constitutional challenge, but found that the Used and
Useful Act violated the equal protection clause. See Long Island Lighting Co. v. Cuomo,
666 F. Supp. 370 (N.D.N.Y. 1987). Plaintiff perfected an appeal of that portion of the
judgment which upheld the LIPA Act (as well as the denial of plaintiff's various other
constitutional challenges), and defendants cross-appealed the adverse holding as to the
Used and Useful Act. Long Island Lighting Co. v. Cuomo, 888 F.2d at 232. After settle-
ment, the parties moved for a consent judgment. When the court denied the motion,
plaintiff (but not defendants) reinstated its appeal. Id. at 252.
The Cuomo court found that the appeal was moot by virtue of the settlement agree-
ment. Further, the court concluded that the Nestle decision required vacatur of that por-
tion of the judgment which was currently on appeal. Although the settlement
agreement did not address the issue of vacatur, the court found that, where the parties
had agreed on settlement, they "necessarily agreed on vacatur of the district court's
judgment." Id. at 234. The court, therefore, ordered vacatur in spite of the defendants'
expressed opposition.
78 Nestle, 756 F.2d at 284.
79 862 F.2d 1299 (7th Cir. 1988).
80 Unlike the litigants in Nestle, the parties in Memorial Hospital explicitly requested
that the court vacate both the district court judgment and the court's opinion. Id. at
1300-01.
81 This rationale may be further supported by the facts in Memorial Hospital. There,
the motion was for vacatur of the district court's opinion. The Second Circuit in Nestle, in
contrast, addressed only the issue of vacating the trial court'sjudgment. But see Nestle, 596
F. Supp. at 1446 (parties' moving papers sought vacatur "of the ruling and order of this
court dated August 23, 1983, together with the findings and conclusions embodied
therein").
82 MemorialHosp., 862 F.2d at 1301.
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tool of the settlement process, a "bargaining chip."83 In addition, a
legal principle that does not require vacatur will encourage settle-
ment at an earlier stage of litigation and thereby conserve judicial
resources.
Finally, the court held that a final judgment implicates not only
the public interest in a decision's precedential value and the possi-
ble preclusive effect of the judgment on third parties, but also addi-
tional public interests, such as vindication of the authority of the
courts. 84 The process that the Nestle decision sanctioned, whereby
the public act of a public official can, in effect, be bought and sold,
was particularly troubling to the court.85 The court concluded that
these public interests must take priority over the private interests of
a litigant in settlement. Although the court agreed that the parties
were free to control the progress of their litigation and the resolu-
tion of their dispute, the court firmly stated that litigants should not
be free to control the permanence of judicial decisions.
8 6
The Ninth Circuit has adopted an intermediate approach. In
two recent cases, Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc. v. Western Conference of Team-
sters87 and National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Seafirst Corp.,88 the
Ninth Circuit concluded that the decision to vacate should be sub-
ject neither to an absolute rule in favor of vacatur nor to an absolute
refusal to vacate. In Ringsby, the court rejected the notion that the
Munsingwear doctrine compelled vacatur. Further, the court de-
nounced the theory that a party should be able singlehandedly to
destroy the collateral consequences of a judgment by giving up his
or her right to appeal through postjudgment settlement.8 9 Rather,
according to the Ringsby court, the decision to vacate should depend
upon a balancing of "the competing values of finality of judgment
and right to relitigation of unreviewed disputes." 90 The Ringsby
court noted that the district court's findings had already been given
collateral estoppel effect in a second action.91 The district court's
ability to rely on the judgment in the settled case would have been
jeopardized if that case had been vacated. Accordingly, the court
declined to undermine that reliance by vacating the original district
court judgment.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 1302-03.
85 Id. at 1302.
86 Id at 1303.
87 686 F.2d 720 (9th Cir. 1982).
88 891 F.2d 762 (9th Cir. 1989).
89 Ringsby, 686 F.2d at 721 (quoting MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 35,
0A1616]).
90 Id. at 722.
91 Id. at 721 n.1.
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In National Union, the Ninth Circuit expanded on the appropri-
ate test to be employed in ruling on motions to vacate. The court
first reaffirmed the vitality of Ringsby and its finding that the Mun-
singwear doctrine is inapplicable to cases which are mooted by settle-
ment. 92 In particular, the court rejected National Union's invitation
to distinguish between situations in which one party acts unilaterally
to moot an action and those in which mootness is the result of bilat-
eral action, such as settlement.
93
While recognizing the importance of encouraging settlement,
the Ninth Circuit opined that parties should not have an absolute
right to destroy the existence of unfavorable judgments at will. The
court agreed with the Nestle policy of encouraging settlements. 94 It
determined, however, that the cost of forgoing the absolute rule of
Nestle was not high enough to outweigh the public interest in the
finality of judgments and the legitimate interest of third parties in
the preclusive effect of the judgment.95
The court also rejected the absolutist approach of Memorial Hos-
pital. In the Ninth Circuit's opinion, such an "inflexible rule ...
would raise the cost of settlement too high." 96 Accordingly, the
Ninth Circuit concluded that the most reasonable approach was to
consider the individual equities involved in each case. In National
Union, that analysis supported the district court's decision to deny
vacatur. National Union had actions pending against a number of
other parties who had intervened in the motion to vacate for the
express purpose of protecting that judgment, along with its attend-
ant collateral effects. The court concluded that, given the existence
of these third party interests, it was reasonable to prohibit National
Union from erasing the collateral effect of the prior judgment.
97
III
THE COST OF VACATUR
Although the decisions discussed above take different ap-
92 National Union, 891 F.2d at 765-67.
93 National Union argued that the Ninth Circuit had recognized a unilat-
eral/bilateral distinction in Harrison Western Corp. v. United States, 792 F.2d 1391 (9th
Cir. 1986). The court found Harrison distinguishable because it did not involve a settle-
ment. See National Union, 891 F.2d at 767.
94 The National Union court noted that in Nestle, unlike Ringsby and National Union,
the settlement was expressly conditioned on vacatur of the trial court's judgment. Na-
tional Union, 891 F.2d at 768. The court found it unnecessary to apply its balancing
analysis to a dispute in which settlement is conditioned on vacatur. See id. at 768 n.2.
95 Id. at 768. By applying a balancing test to the facts in Nestle, the Ninth Circuit
apparently would have denied the motion to vacate, based on the third party interests
set out in the district court opinion.
96 Id at 769.
97 Id
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proaches in analyzing the proper judicial reaction to a motion to
vacate,98 the cases employ the same basic equation: measuring the
cost of vacatur against the cost of denying the motion to vacate. 99
Each court expressed a concern for the efficient use of litigant and
judicial resources and attempted to balance the public costs of vaca-
tur against the costs of forgoing a possible settlement. Such a calcu-
lation is idealiy suited for economic analysis.
An analysis of the costs of vacatur may be disturbing to those
scholhirs' 0 0 who embrace a purely privatel0 1 view of litigation. 10 2
For them, it is inappropriate to prohibit vacatur if a settlement is
thereby thwarted because such conduct compels the litigants to be
unwilling "private attorneys general," forced to litigate on behalf of
the public interest 10 3 rather than in pursuit of their private goals.' 0
4
98 Although the difference in treatment between Nestle and the other cases is based,
in part, on the fact that the settlement in Nestle was conditioned on vacatur, neither the
Seventh nor the Ninth Circuit relied on that ground to distinguish Nestle. Moreover, the
Second Circuit has expanded the Nestle rule to cases in which settlement was not explic-
itly contingent on vacatur. See Long Island Lighting Co. v. Cuomo, 888 F.2d 230, 233
(2d Cir. 1989).
99 See National Union, 891 F.2d at 768 ("While [the Nestle] position is not without
some merit .... we elect to weigh the policy interests differently.").
100 See, e.g., WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 12; Note, Collateral Estoppel Effects
ofJudgments Vacated Pursuant to Settlement, 1987 U. ILL. L. REv. 731, 751-53 (authored by
Stuart N. Rappaport).
101 In the traditional model of litigation, an action is viewed as bipolar with a self-
contained impact; that is, the impact of the judgment is confined to the parties. Tradi-
tional litigation is considered party initiated and party controlled. See Chayes, supra note
11, at 1282-83. Professor Fiss terms this model the "dispute-resolution" model of litiga-
tion. Fiss, The Supreme Court, supra note 15, at 17.
102 In recent years, scholars such as Professors Chayes and Fiss have observed that
much civil litigation has evolved away from this private dispute model. See Fiss, The
Supreme Court, supra note 15, at 44 ("Dispute resolution... does not represent the ideal
for adjudication ....").
Chayes has observed that civil litigation is now increasingly concerned with enforc-
ing public values, citing areas such as school desegregation cases, antitrust, securities
law, and environmental litigation. In all of these areas and many others, the litigants are
doing more than addressing a private wrong; they are identifying and seeking to remedy
an ongoing mischief and its consequences, not merely for them but for others. Profes-
sor Chayes terms this type of litigation "public law litigation" and suggests that this
evolution requires a reconsideration of the court's role in the judicial process. See
Abram Chayes, The Supreme Court 1981 Term-Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger
Court, 96 HAtv. L. REv. 4 (1982).
103 Professor Fiss answers this argument by asserting that it misapprehends the true
costs of a settlement:
To be against settlement is not to urge that parties be "forced" to liti-
gate, since that would interfere with their autonomy and distort the adju-
dicative process; the parties will be inclined to make the court believe that
their bargain is justice. To be against settlement is only to suggest that
when the parties settle, society gets less than what appears, and for a
price it does not know it is paying.
Fiss, supra note 8, at 1085.
104 See Nestle Co. v. Chester's Mkt., Inc., 756 F.2d 280, 284 (2d Cir. 1985).
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The response to this argument is that judicial action in cases such as
Memorial Hospital does not prevent the parties from settling the liti-
gation; rather, it simply prevents the parties from agreeing to re-
quire an affirmative judicial action-vacatur.
The starting point for Judge Easterbrook's analysis in Memorial
Hospital was his observation that a judicial decision is something
more than the resolution of a private inter-party dispute. Judge Eas-
terbrook termed a judicial decision, whether in the form of a court
decision or ajury verdict, a public act.105 Curiously, neither the Sec-
ond nor the Ninth Circuit rejects this characterization; indeed, both
expressly accept it as valid. The disagreement concerns how much
weight to give the public nature of the decision.
The judicial determination whether to grant a motion to vacate
is also a public act. The granting of a motion to vacate is not minis-
terial. 10 6 By propounding a rule that motions to vacate will not be
routinely granted in situations involving postjudgment settlement,
the courts are indicating that this is one of the many areas in which
courts will not be bound by the agreement of the parties.10 7 For
105 Moreover, under the public law model of litigation, the court must consider the
public impact of rendering any judicial decision. Where the public law model is dearly
applicable, judges cannot escape the policy implications of their decisions; their actions
have a public effect which extends beyond the impact on the litigants. See Chayes, supra
note 102. Compare United States v. Mansion House Center North, 95 F.R.D. 515 (E.D.
Mo. 1982) (refusing to permit the government to settle a case which it initiated for the
purpose of protecting the public interest), reu'd in part on other grounds, 742 F.2d 476 (8th
Cir. 1984). "These cases involve issues that in importance rise above the normal mat-
ters addressed by private litigants in lawsuits." Id. at 517.
106 See supra notes 47-97 and accompanying text.
107 This concept is not unique to the issue of vacatur. There are many subjects upon
which the agreement of the parties has been held insufficient to bind the court. See, e.g.,
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (parties cannot confer jurisdiction on the court by agree-
ment), reh'g denied, 368 U.S. 869 (1961); Swift & Co. v. Hocking Valley R.R., 243 U.S.
281, 289 (1917) (stipulation by parties cannot bind the court in respect of its adjudica-
tory function); O'Connor v. City of Denver, 894 F.2d 1210, 1225-26 (10th Cir. 1990)
(court determines the effect, if any, of stipulations of fact); Technicon Instruments Corp.
v. Alpkem Corp., 866 F.2d 417, 421 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (parties cannot raise appellate issue
by stipulation); National Advertising Co. v. City of Rolling Meadows, 789 F.2d 571, 574
(7th Cir. 1986) (party may not compel a court to decide a constitutional issue by stipula-
tion); see also JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, IN TRILs AT COMMON LAW § 7a, at 601 n.35
(Tillers rev. 1983) (discussing judicial reluctance to accept stipulations by parties which
contravene the rules of evidence). These decisions place a higher premium on the in-
tegrity of the tribunal than on the right of the parties to control their lawsuit. As Profes-
sor Wigmore observes, it is not clear that this position actually conflicts with the
assumed right of the parties to control the disposition of their dispute. Id. at 604. The
parties may be free to choose their adjudicative forum, but having chosen it, they may
reasonably be bound by the rules of that forum. Those rules may include limitations on
the manner by which parties may dispose of actions.
The ability of litigants to "gag" the court through settlement and vacatur is analo-
gous to the use of umbrella protective or "secrecy" orders. These orders involve the
sealing of court files after settlement with an agreement by the parties and their attor-
neys not to reveal the information disclosed during discovery, the fact and amount of a
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example, as the court observed in NLRB v. Brooke Industries, Inc.,°108
the judicial policy in favor of encouraging settlement does not re-
quire the courts to accept and enforce every consent agreement of
the parties:
If [the parties] had agreed that Brooke would be ordered to break
the knees of its director of labor-management relations, or make
the director wear a dunce cap, a court would not be required to
enforce a judgment embodying that order. That would be a dear
case of a consent judgment's affecting the rights of a third party.
Far from being required to rubber stamp such ajudgment, a court
would be obliged to reject it.1°9
Similarly, there are circumstances in which the court is explicitly re-
quired to consider the effect that termination of a lawsuit has upon
third parties or the public interest before permitting settlement or
dismissal of the suit. 10 Although a party should not be required to
continue with a lawsuit against his or her will, it is not a necessary
corollary that a court must do everything in its power to persuade
the parties to terminate the litigation."'
settlement, or both. See Philip H. Corboy, Gagging Plaintifls with Money Assaults the Public
Interest, THE MANHArrAN LAWYER, Mar. 1990, at 16. Although courts have traditionally
approved protective orders when both sides agree, the courts in several recent cases
have recognized a public interest in obtaining access to litigation information which
goes beyond the private interest of the individual parties to that litigation. See, e.g., Ci-
pollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1121 (3d Cir. 1986) (requiring defendant
to show that disclosure would cause specific and significant harm to justify protective
order); Graham v. Wyeth Labs., 118 F.R.D. 511 (D. Kan. 1988) (refusing request for
secrecy order to protect discovery information in DPT vaccine litigation); Garcia v.
Peeples, 734 S.W.2d 343, 347 (Tex. 1987) (overturning trial court's secrecy order).
108 867 F.2d 434 (7th Cir. 1989).
109 Id. at 435.
110 See, e.g., Desimone v. Industrial Bio-Test Labs., Inc., 83 F.R.D. 615 (S.D.N.Y.
1979) (discussion of factors court must consider in deciding whether to approve a pro-
posed settlement of class action); FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) (requiring court approval for
dismissal or compromise of class action); FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1 (requiring court approval
for dismissal or compromise of shareholder derivative action); William E. Haudek, The
Settlement and Dismissal of Stockholders'Actions-Part 11: The Settlement, 23 Sw. LJ. 765 (1969)
(discussing the mechanics of obtaining judicial approval of a derivative suit settlement).
For an example of a court's detailed consideration of the effect of settlement in a lawsuit
concerning the provision of foster care services not only on the plaintiff class, but also
on the objecting defendant agencies, the city's child care system, and the public at large,
see Wilder v. Bernstein, 645 F. Supp. 1292 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
111 Indeed, the propriety of a federal judge acting to facilitate settlement has
sparked considerable debate. See generally Chayes, supra note 11; Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, Essay: For and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the Mandatory Settlement Confer-
ence, 33 UCLA L. REv. 485 (1985); Judith Resnick, Managerial Judges, 96 HAsty. L. REv.
374 (1982); Hon. Hubert L. Will, Hon. Robert R. Merhige, Jr. & Hon. Alvin B. Rubin,
The Role of the Judge in the Settlement Process, 75 F.R.D. 203 (1977). Critics of this judicial
involvement suggest that by acting as case "managers" rather than adjudicators, judges
may lose the impartiality and perspective that render their decisions legitimate. See Res-
nick, supra, at 424-31; see also Schuck, supra note 26, at 359-65 (risks ofjudicial involve-
ment include overreaching, overcommitment of the judge to settlement, and procedural
1991] 609
610 CORNELL LAW RE VIEW [Vol. 76:589
A strict reading of the Nestle decision suggests that the Second
Circuit believes that litigants are entitled to vacatur as a matter of
right when they settle a case conditioned on vacatur. 112 Under the
Nestle theory, the private interests of the parties in settlement 113 out-
weigh the public costs of vacatur as a matter of law. 114 Given the
judicial discretion inherent in the sources of the courts' authority to
vacate, however, an absolute rule of law must be based on an ex-
press or implied judicial resolution of this calculus. Only by appre-
ciating both the public costs of vacatur as well as the effect of
vacatur on settlement, can we properly evaluate the Nestle rule.
A. Preclusive Effect of a Final Judgment
1. Claim Preclusion and Issue Preclusion
The most significant cost associated with vacatur is the destruc-
tion of a judgment's preclusive effect. A prior judgment 115 may
serve as a bar to future litigation' 1 6 in two ways: as a bar to relitiga-
tion of the same claims under the doctrine of res judicata, and as a
unfairness). Several scholars have also observed that judicial involvement in the settle-
ment process has failed to produce any empirically measurable difference in settlement
rates. See Menkel-Meadow, supra, at 488 n.19 & 494; Resnick, supra, at 417-24.
112 See Nestle Co. v. Chester's Mkt., Inc., 756 F.2d 280, 283 (2d Cir. 1985); Note,
Settlement Pending Appeal, supra note 5, at 241 n.55. Indeed, the Seventh Circuit's opinion
in Memorial Hospital can also be read as espousing a mandatory rule of law. See Memorial
Hosp. v. United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 862 F.2d 1299, 1300 (7th Cir.
1988).
113 The Second Circuit, which has adopted the most prosettlement rule regarding
motions to vacate, is the same Circuit that has adopted the most innovative procedural
reform for encouraging settlement of cases pending appeal. See supra note 6. Perhaps
the Second Circuit's prosettlement attitude is more reflective of concerns over the man-
agement of appellate dockets than concerns for the rights of litigants. Neither the Sev-
enth nor the Ninth Circuit has a preargument conference program in which the litigants
are "encouraged" to settle the action. See id.
114 Based on the trial court's explicit finding in Nestle that the parties' interests in
settlement were outweighed by the public interest in favor of finality, the Second Cir-
cuit's reversal under an abuse of discretion standard is difficult to justify unless the Sec-
ond Circuit's rule is interpreted as an absolute legal standard. See Note, Avoiding Issue
Preclusion, supra note 5, at 865 n.34.
115 Preclusive effect under principles of collateral estoppel may apply to less formal
determinations as well as to finaljudgments. See, e.g., Hartley v. Mentor Corp., 869 F.2d
1469 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (preclusive effect given to stipulated judgment); Wellons, Inc. v.
T.E. Ibberson Co., 869 F.2d 1166, 1168 (8th Cir. 1989) (collateral estoppel effect may
be given to arbitration award).
116 For purposes of this Article, the preclusive effect of a judgment is significant
primarily in preventing future litigation with third parties. The usual settlement agree-
ment provides for a resolution of all pending claims between the parties arising from the
subject transaction and includes a release of such claims. Therefore, the collateral effect
of the judgment is unlikely to be relevant to any later litigation between the same par-
ties. Moreover, because the parties have settled the action, the claims which form the
subject of the litigation are not likely to be the subject of further litigation between the
original parties, and the resjudicata effect of the prior judgment, as between them, be-
comes insignificant. Cf. United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 37 (1950) (at-
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binding resolution of issues previously litigated, under the doctrine
of collateral estoppel.' 17 Under the res judicata doctrine, a prior
judgment which resolves litigation bars all future claims between the
same parties arising out of that transaction.' 18 Res judicata, also
known as claim preclusion, bars all claims arising out of the same
"nucleus of operative facts" whether or not such claims were actu-
ally litigated in the first action.' 9 The preclusive effects of the doc-
trine of res judicata are limited to litigants who were actually parties
to the first litigation, parties which were effectively represented in
the first litigation, and their privies.
120
tempt by United States to litigate the same issues against defendant with respect to a
later time period).
Moreover, any concern about whether the judgment can be used collaterally be-
tween the original litigants can be addressed explicitly in the settlement agreement. The
settling parties can provide for resolution of the collateral consequences of the judg-
ment inter se by contract. See Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d at 1303. The parties may agree by
contract not to plead the judgment as preclusive in any further dispute.
117 Res judicata and collateral estoppel collectively form the law of preclusion. See
FLEMING JAMES, JR. & GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 11.3 (3d ed. 1985).
It is unclear whether the appropriate law of preclusion in the federal courts is federal law
or the law of the forum state. Compare St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Weiner, 606
F.2d 864, 868 (9th Cir. 1979) (a federal court sitting in diversity should apply the preclu-
sion rules of the forum state) with Allan D. Vestal, ResJudicata/Preclusion by Judgment: The
Law Applied in Federal Courts, 66 MICH L. REV. 1723 (1968) (advocating a uniform federal
law of preclusion in federal courts).
The preclusion standards of most states hold that federal law determines the
preclusive effect of a federal court judgment. See Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165 (1938)
(the scope and effect of a federal courtjudgment is a matter of federal law); Pili& & Pili6
v. Metz, 547 So. 2d 1305, 1310-11 (La. 1989) (citing cases); WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER,
supra note 12, § 4468; Ronan E. Degnan, Federalized ResJudicata, 85 YALE LJ. 741 (1976);
see, e.g., Smith v. Safeco Ins. Co., 863 F.2d 403, 404 (5th Cir. 1989) (federal law should
be applied to determine the preclusive effect of the judgment in a diversity case). Thus,
the effect of vacatur on the preclusive effect of a federal district court judgment is a
matter of federal law. Cf Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470
U.S. 373, 380 (1985) (the law of the rendering state determines the preclusive effect of a
state court judgment); Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 481-82 (1982)
(same).
118 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 comment a (1982).
119 See, e.g., Lane v. Peterson, 899 F.2d 737, 742-43 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
74 (1990); Olmstead v. Amoco Oil Co., 725 F.2d 627, 632 (11th Cir.), reh'g denied, 731
F.2d 891 (11th Cir. 1984); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 comment b
(1982).
120 Professor Semmel describes the concept of privity as follows:
Where a party to the second action was not a party to or in control of the
first action he may still be bound if his relationship to a party in the first
action is sufficiently close, his interests were adequately represented and
there are independent reasons (other than avoiding repeated litigation)
for holding the first judgment binding.
Herbert Semmel, Collateral Estoppel, Mutuality and Joinder of Parties, 68 COLUM. L. REV.
1457, 1459-60 (1968). For a description of the categories of litigants which may be
considered bound by a prior judgment based on the concepts of common interest, ade-
quate representation, or control, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 39-42
(1982).
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Commentators have focused primarily on the effect of vacatur
on collateral estoppel,' 21 but vacatur may be used to avoid the res
judicata consequences of a judgment as well. Indeed, the govern-
ment in Munsingwear was seeking to avoid application of the doctrine
of res judicata. 122 And in National Union, the judgment from which
National Union unsuccessfully sought relief was found to have res
judicata effect in a subsequent action by National Union against
Seafirst's attorneys. 123 With the movement away from a strict rule
of privity to one in which the courts take a more pragmatic ap-
proach-i.e., apply res judicata to litigants whose interests were ade-
quately represented in the prior proceedingl 24-courts must
consider both the res judicata and collateral estoppel effects of a
judgment when ruling on a motion to vacate. 125
The preclusion doctrine more commonly implicated by vacatur
decisions is the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Collateral estoppel
or issue preclusion provides that if an issue is fully and fairly liti-
gated, the loser will be barred from challenging the determination
of that issue in a subsequent action. Unlike resjudicata, the modern
doctrine of collateral estoppel does not require mutuality-that is,
collateral estoppel may be invoked by, although not against, a liti-
gant who was not a party to the initial litigation.' 26
The requisites for application of collateral estoppel have been
articulated in a number of ways, but the general requirements are
undisputed. To give a previous judgment preclusive effect, "the is-
sue must have been actually litigated in the prior proceeding, the
parties must have been given a full and fair opportunity to do so,
and the issue must provide the basis for the final judgment entered
therein."' 27 Cases frequently suggest other factors, but they are
121 See Note, Settlement Pending Appeal, supra note 5, at 247-50 (discussing effect of
vacatur on issue preclusion); Note, Avoiding Issue Preclusion, supra note 5, at 860 (focusing
on effect of vacatur on issue preclusion); Note, The Impact of Collateral Estoppel, supra note
5, at 343 (focusing on doctrine of collateral estoppel).
122 See United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 39, 39 (1950).
123 The court in Davis, Wright &Jones v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 709 F. Supp.
196 (W.D. Wash. 1989) found that Seafirst's attorneys were in privity with Seafirst for
purposes of resjudicata. In so holding, the court noted that the doctrine of resjudicata
had expanded to encompass a broader circle of litigants, including those who were effec-
tively represented in a prior litigation. "[S]trict rules of privity no longer govern
whether res judicata is applicable." Id. at 201.
124 See, e.g., Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 135 (1983); cf Martin v. Wilks,
490 U.S. 755 (1989).
125 Although expansion of the doctrine ofresjudicata increases the possibility that a
judgment may be applied to bar relitigation by or against related parties, see supra note
123, the original litigants are not likely to use the judgment between themselves.
126 The Supreme Court abandoned the federal requirement of mutuality for applica-
tion of collateral estoppel in Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402
U.S. 313, 313 (1971) and Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 322 (1979).
127 Hartley v. Mentor Corp., 869 F.2d 1469, 1471 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
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merely variations on the three factors articulated in this simple test.
For example, in Parklane Hosiery, the Supreme Court suggested that
collateral estoppel should not apply if the party in the first case did
not have "every incentive" to litigate the first action "fully and vig-
orously."' 28 Although the Court may have intended to add an ele-
ment, as a practical matter it was simply providing interpretive
guidance for the requirement that a party have a full and fair oppor-
tunity to litigate the issue in the first case. 129
In recent years, the federal courts have become increasingly
willing to apply collateral estoppel to prevent multiple or repeated
litigation of the same issue.'30 The Supreme Court has explained
the policy reasons for the doctrine as follows:
To preclude parties from contesting matters that they have had a
full and fair opportunity to litigate protects their adversaries from
the expense and vexation attending multiple lawsuits, conserves
judicial resources, and fosters reliance on judicial action by mini-
mizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions.' 3 '
In Munsingwear the Court noted the strong policy supporting the use
of res judicata and collateral estoppel and expressly approved the
"principle which seeks to bring litigation to an end and promote
certainty in legal relations"132 Accordingly, if the prerequisites are
met, courts favor the application of collateral estoppel.13 3
128 Parklane Hosiey, 439 U.S. at 332.
129 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982).
130 As the Blonder-Tongue Court observed:
Permitting repeated litigation of the same issue as long as the supply of
unrelated defendants holds out reflects either the aura of the gaming ta-
ble or "a lack of discipline and of disinterestedness on the part of the
lower courts, hardly a worthy or wise basis for fashioning rules of
procedure."
402 U.S. at 329 (quoting Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180,
185 (1952)); see also Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 326 (issue preclusion serves the "dual
purpose of protecting litigants from the burden of relitigating an identical issue.., and
of promoting judicial economy by preventing needless litigation").
131 Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-54 (1979).
132 United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 38 (1950). Indeed, the out-
come in Munsingwear results from the Court's conclusion that the need for res judicata in
"providing terminal points for litigation" outweighs the government's claim of preju-
dice from application of the doctrine. Id at 41.
133 The federal courts have frequently given preclusive effect to findings in prelimi-
nary proceedings, such as motions for preliminary injunctions. See, e.g., Commodity Fu-
tures Trading Comm'n v. Board of Trade, 701 F.2d 653, 657 (7th Cir. 1983). The
courts' rationale is that such findings may have been rendered under circumstances
which make them sufficiently reliable to preclude relitigation. For example, in Commodity
Futures, the court noted that the lower court judge had made some 45 detailed findings
of fact after a six-day hearing on the preliminary injunction, and that these findings were
later affirmed on appeal. The court concluded that the trial court was not required to
vacate those findings, an action that would have prevented subsequent courts from giv-
ing them predusive effect.
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Litigants may invoke collateral estoppel offensively or defen-
sively.134 In defensive collateral estoppel, a defendant interposes as
a complete or partial defense a prior adverse determination against
the plaintiff. The defendant's argument is essentially "you lost
against someone else; you can't relitigate the same issue against
me." Such use of collateral estoppel prevents a plaintiff who lost in
previous litigation from relitigating his or her case against a new
opponent.
In offensive collateral estoppel, a plaintiff seeks to prevent the
defendant from denying liability on the theory that a court has ad-
judged the defendant liable in a previous action. 135 For example, a
plaintiff in a product liability lawsuit may use offensive collateral es-
toppel to take advantage of the fact that the defendant manufacturer
has already litigated against another plaintiff the issue of whether
the product is unreasonably dangerous, and lost.136
Commentators have suggested that, whereas defensive collat-
eral estoppel promotes judicial economy by encouraging plaintiffs
to join all possible defendants in a single action, offensive collateral
estoppel has the opposite effect.' 37 A potential plaintiff may ob-
serve the progress of the litigation, secure in the knowledge that he
or she may take advantage of any favorable results in that litigation,
without being bound by any adverse rulings. 3 8
134 The distinction between offensive and defensive collateral estoppel was first ar-
ticulated in Currie, supra note 19.
135 The Supreme Court has described offensive collateral estoppel as the situation in
which "a plaintiff is seeking to estop a defendant from relitigating the issues which the
defendant previously litigated and lost against another plaintiff." Parklane Hosiery, 439
U.S. at 329.
136 Professor Ratcliff terms the ability of a future plaintiff to take advantage of the
favorable aspects of a prior litigation while avoiding unfavorable results, the "option
effect." See Jack Ratcliff, Offensive Collateral Estappel and the Option Effect, 67 TEx. L. REV. 63
(1988).
137 See Michael A. Berch, A Proposal To Permit Collateral Estoppel of Nonparties Seeking
Affirmative Relief, 1979 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 511, 530-31; Semmel, supra note 120; Note, Preclu-
sion of Absent Disputants to Compel Intervention, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1551, 1554 (1979) (au-
thored by Louis Touton); Note, Nonmutuality: Taking the Fairness out of Collateral Estoppel,
13 IND. L. REV. 563, 571 (1980) (authored by Janet Schmitt Ellis); Comment, Mandatoy
Intervention: Expansion of Collateral Estoppel in Favor of Single Defendants Against Multiple Plain-
tffls in Federal Civil Litigation, 14 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 441, 442 (1981) (authored by
Michael C. Sachs); Note, supra note 100, at 737-38; Note, Avoiding Issue Preclusion, supra
note 5, at 860; cf Craig Callen & David Kadue, To Bury Mutuality, Not to Praise It: An
Analysis of Collateral Estoppel After Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 31 HASTINGS LJ. 755
(1980) (arguing that criticism of using offensive unilateral collateral estoppel has been
exaggerated and that courts are quite capable of applying the doctrine fairly).
138 Some might argue that a court's decision on a motion to vacate should consider
the type of estoppel that may result from the judgment, and that a court should decline
to award vacatur in cases in which defensive collateral estoppel may be anticipated. The
rationale of this approach is that defensive collateral estoppel promotes efficiency and
reduces potential unfairness to future litigants. Courts, however, do not appear to have
considered this factor. In Nestle, for example, the court seemed unconcerned that the
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2. The Effect of Vacatur on Preclusion
A final judgment by a federal court retains all of its preclusive
effect pending appeal; the doctrines of collateral estoppel or res
judicata may be applied to a judgment which is pending appeal. 3 9
Though there is no requirement that a judgment be appealed (and
subsequently affirmed) in order to have collateral estoppel effect, 140
the fact that a party has appealed does not prevent ajudgment from
being used as a basis for collateral estoppel. t4' Nor will a settlement
alone 142 destroy the collateral estoppel effect of a judgment. 43
Vacatur of a judgment, however, generally prevents the use of
that judgment for collateral estoppel purposes. "A judgment that
has been vacated, reversed, or set aside on appeal is thereby de-
original finding of trademark invalidity could have been used defensively by future liti-
gants against whom Nestle might bring a claim of trademark infringement.
139 See, e.g., SSIH Equip. S.A. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 718 F.2d 365,
370 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("the law is well settled that the pendency of an appeal has no affect
[sic] on the finality or binding effect of a trial court's holding"); Hunt v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 707 F.2d 1493, 1497 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("Under well-settled federal law, the pen-
dency of an appeal does not diminish the resjudicata effect of a judgment rendered by a
federal court."); MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 35, at 521 ("pendency-of an
appeal does not suspend the operation of an otherwise final judgment as resjudicata or
collateral estoppel" (footnote omitted)); see also 18 WRIGHT, MILuR & COOPER, supra
note 12, § 4433, at 305-20.
140 The cases recognize the preclusive effect of ajudgment from which no appeal is
taken. See, e.g., Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394 (1981) (resjudicata
applies to an unappealed adverse judgment); United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340
U.S. 36, 39 (1950) ("Concededly the judgment in the first suit would be binding in the
subsequent ones if an appeal, though available, had not been taken or perfected.").
The case law, however, distinguishes between situations in which a party has and
forgoes a right to appeal and situations in which no appeal is possible. See, e.g., id. at 40.
It is often the case that an appeal is technically possible, but practically unavailable. A
party may "choose" to forgo an appeal simply because he or she lacks the finances for
further litigation. See, e.g., Charles Allan Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate
Courts, 41 MINN. L. REV. 751, 780 (1957) ("If in two similar cases the person rich enough
to afford an appeal gets a reversal, however just, while the person of insufficient means
to risk an appeal is forced to live with the judgment of the trial court, has justice really
been improved?"). Although litigants may argue the unfairness of applying issue pre-
clusion under these circumstances, the law of collateral estoppel does not recognize this
form of hardship. The "hardship" attendant in not being able to buy off the collateral
effect of an adverse judgment through the settlement process pales next to a party's
inability to attack that adverse judgment directly.
141 See SSIH Equip. S.A., 718 F.2d at 370; McLendon v. Continental Group, Inc., 660
F. Supp. 1553 (D.NJ. 1987); 18 WRIGHT, MIL.R & COOPER, supra note 12, § 4433, at
308.
142 Settlement of an action prior to the entry of final judgment generally will not
result in collateral estoppel effect on the litigation. See Kasper Wire Works, Inc. v. Leco
Eng'g & Mach., Inc., 575 F.2d 530, 538 (5th Cir. 1978).
143 See Hartley v. Mentor Corp., 869 F.2d 1469, 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1989); see also Gould
v. Control Laser Corp., 866 F.2d 1391, 1392 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc.
v. Western Conference of Teamsters, 686 F.2d 720, 720 (9th Cir. 1982); Kurlan v. Com-
missioner, 343 F.2d 625 (2d Cir. 1965) (giving collateral estoppel effect to opinion of
appellate court even though case had been settled on remand).
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prived of all conclusive effect, both as res judicata and as collateral
estoppel. The same is true, of course, of a judgment vacated by a
trial court."' 144 "[Tlhe general rule is that a judgment which is va-
cated, for whatever reason, is deprived of its conclusive effect as col-
lateral estoppel."'
145
One possible reason for the failure of courts to give a vacated
judgment preclusive effect is their perception that the issue of pre-
clusion has been considered and implicitly addressed by the vacatur
decision. Moreover, a party which has settled on condition of vaca-
tur is deprived of his or her bargained-for gain if preclusive effect is
subsequently applied to the vacated judgment.
146
On a more practical note, it is frequently difficult to apply
preclusive effect to vacated judgments because of the second court's
inability to discern the basis for vacatur. Although collateral estop-
pel might be warranted in the case of a vacatur predicated on settle-
ment, vacatur premised on mootness, fraud, or mistake would not
justify application of collateral estoppel. In the majority of cases,
however, there is no official record of the basis for the vacatur
decision.
Destruction of an adverse judgment's collateral estoppel effect
is the most common reason for a party to seek vacatur. For exam-
ple, in Munsingwear, the government wanted the prior judgment va-
cated because Munsingwear was attempting to have the second
price-fixing lawsuit against it dismissed, based on the collateral es-
toppel effect of the first judgment. Similarly, the collateral estoppel
effect of the original judgment was an important aspect of the Na-
tional Union decision. The defendant National Union had actions
pending against several other parties based on the same transaction.
The settlement agreement between National Union and Seafirst
specifically required Seafirst to join in National Union's motion for
vacatur, and Seafirst did so. The third parties then moved to inter-
144 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 35, 0.4 16[2], at 517; see also Jaffree v.
Wallace, 837 F.2d 1461, 1466 (11th Cir. 1988).
145 Dodrill v. Ludt, 764 F.2d 442, 444 (6th Cir. 1985). This principle, though, does
not have absolute acceptance. See Chemetron Corp. v. Business Funds, Inc., 682 F.2d
1149, 1191-92 (5th Cir. 1982) (permitting use of offensive collateral estoppel where
defendant settled lawsuit after trial but before final judgment was entered), vacated on
other grounds and remanded, 460 U.S. 1007, initial opinion adhered to on remand, 718 F.2d 725
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1013 (1983). Courts have not widely followed Chemetron
and commentators have criticized the case for its failure to give effect to a prior court's
decision to vacate. See, e.g., Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v.John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
722 F. Supp. 998, 1010 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Barker, supra note 5, at 3, col. 1.
146 See Note, Settlement Pending Appeal, supra note 5, at 248 ("widespread use of issue
preclusion in cases when [sic] the prior judgment has been vacated might discourage
settlement"); Note, Avoiding Issue Preclusion, supra note 5, at 863-64 ("A rule permitting a
second forum to preclude relitigation of issues contained in a vacated judgment would
reduce settlement conditioned on vacatur to simple settlement.").
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vene in the motion to vacate in order to argue the issue of the effect
of vacatur on National Union's other lawsuits. 147 As the intervenors
demonstrated to the Ninth Circuit, the district court's judgment had
already been found by other courts to have preclusive effect-a
preclusive effect which would be destroyed were the court to grant
vacatur.
The decision to vacate a judgment is, in essence, a determina-
tion by the original court that principles of collateral estoppel and
res judicata will not apply to that original judgment. Therefore, a
litigant who is unhappy with a prior decision will attempt to condi-
tion settlement on vacatur, as Nestle did. If the court grants the
motion to vacate, the adverse judgment is removed from the record
books, and any preclusive effect of that judgment is destroyed.
148
Commentators have argued that the vacating court need not
concern itself with collateral estoppel effects; this issue will be de-
cided if and when a subsequent court is asked to give the prior judg-
ment preclusive effect. 149 The applicability of res judicata and
collateral estoppel cannot be accurately ascertained 50 until the sub-
sequent litigation is commenced. By granting a motion to vacate,
the original court essentially would be prejudging the issue and at-
tempting to prevent later courts from giving its judgment
preclusion. 15'
On the other hand, the argument in favor of having the initial
judge consider collateral estoppel effects is that he or she is in the
best position to decide, at least in the first instance, whether his or
her judgment should continue to enjoy any vitality. The court which
presided over the trial, heard the witnesses, and perhaps played a
147 See, e.g., National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Davis, Wright, Todd, Reise &Jones, 157
A.D.2d 571, 550 N.Y.S.2d 315 (1990) (holding that collateral estoppel effect of Seafirst
judgment barred subsequent suit in New York).
148 Cf Chemetron, 682 F.2d 1149, vacated on other grounds and remanded, 460 U.S. 1007
(1983).
149 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 27-29 (1982); Note, Avoiding
Issue Preclusion, supra note 5, at 876-78. For example, the subsequent court can decide
whether the inability of a litigant to obtain appellate review in the initial action has de-
prived the litigant of a "fill and fair opportunity to litigate." See Gould v. Control Laser
Corp., 866 F.2d 1391, 1395 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (Nichols, J., dissenting).
150 The Ninth Circuit in National Union found the possibility of a preclusive effect
sufficient tojustfy denying the motion to vacate. National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Seafirst
Corp., 891 F.2d 762, 769 (9th Cir. 1989).
151 See Gould, 866 F.2d at 1395 n.6:
"[t]he Blonder-Tongue issue is of speculative effect until any subsequent
litigation is undertaken." The applicability of Blonder-Tongue, in a situa-
tion where an agreed settlement and judgment moots the intended and
expected appeal, is best left to such later litigation. Vacating the consent
judgment would preclude a collateral estoppel defense in a later case and
decide the issue before it arises.
(quoting a at 1395 (Nichols, J., dissenting)).
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role in the settlement of the case, is usually the best arbiter of ques-
tions such as whether the parties had a full and fair opportunity to
litigate the issues in the case. Usually the trial court is also in the
best position to decide whether the settlement of the litigation
caused a party to forgo a potentially viable appeal and whether the
parties have manipulated the procedural posture of the litigation in
an effort to multiply their opportunities to litigate the same issues.
Accordingly, the trial court should decide whether its prior judicial
actions should be erased by vacatur by assessing these issues.' 52
The denial of a motion to vacate would indicate to a later court that
the first court felt its judgment to be sufficiently supported by the
evidence, sufficiently final, and of sufficient impact to be retained
notwithstanding the subsequent settlement. 153
The problem with allowing a subsequent court to give collateral
estoppel effect to a vacated judgment is illustrated by the one dis-
covered case in which a court chose to do so. In Chemetron Corp. v.
Business Funds, Inc., 54 a subsequent court gave collateral estoppel
effect to findings which had been vacated as a result of settlement.
The initial litigation was Cosmos Bank v. Bintlif, 55 a two-month
bench trial in Texas. The trial judge in that case made some 221
findings of fact at the conclusion of the trial and awarded judgment
against Bintliff, but did not enter a finaljudgment. Instead, the par-
ties settled the case and jointly petitioned the court to dismiss the
action with prejudice and to withdraw its findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law. The court agreed to do so.
15 6
In the subsequent securities case, Chemetron sought, by means
of offensive collateral estoppel, to rely on a number of factual issues
which had been decided adversely to defendant Bintliff in the prior
trial. The Fifth Circuit addressed what it considered to be a novel
question of law: whether the Cosmos Bank litigation was sufficiently
final to permit the application of collateral estoppel, even though
the trial judge never entered a final judgment before settlement.
152 The trial court's decision to vacate a judgment after settlement may alko reflect
uncertainty about the decision.
153 Courts which have attempted simultaneously to vacate and retain the preceden-
tial value of their decisions have met with little success. In Mason Tenders District
Council Welfare Fund v. Dalton, 648 F. Supp. 1309, vacated upon request of the parties, 648
F. Supp. at 1318 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), the district court published an opinion despite subse-
quent vacatur, presumably because the opinion dealt with an important issue of first
impression in the Circuit. The Second Circuit thwarted a later court's attempt to rely on
that decision. See Mason Tenders Dist. Council Welfare Fund v. Akaty Constr. Corp.,
724 F. Supp. 209 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), vacated and withdrawn from bound volume by request of the
court (1990) (available in advance sheets only).
'54 682 F.2d 1149 (5th Cir. 1982).
155 No. 67-H-590 (S.D. Tex. 1975).
156 Chemetron, 682 F.2d at 1187-88 (discussing procedural history of the litigation).
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The Chemetron court, after considering the policy behind the applica-
tion of collateral estoppel, concluded that Chemetron could pre-
clude Bintliff from relitigating the issues which had been decided in
the prior litigation. The court stated that Bintliff had received a full
and fair opportunity to litigate the issues in the original litigation
and that absolute finality, such as the actual entry of a final judg-
ment, was not required by the doctrine of collateral estoppel.' 57
Although the Chemetron court gave considerable attention to the
finality issue, it did not explicitly consider the effect of the trial
court's order withdrawing its findings of fact. That issue was ad-
dressed only in the partial dissent ofJudge Reavley, who concluded
that the application of estoppel was unwarranted where the parties
had expressly provided by the terms of their settlement that estop-
pel should not apply.158 Judge Reavley's opinion went further, how-
ever, and condemned the application of collateral estoppel to cases
in which the parties reached settlement after final judgment without
obtaining vacatur. Stressing the importance of post-trial settle-
ments, he defended the litigant's right to settle a case for the pur-
pose of avoiding the collateral estoppel effect of the district court's
findings. 159 According to Judge Reavley, judicial interference with
that right is "bad law and bad policy.'
60
Courts have not widely followed Chemetron 161 for a number of
reasons. First, by predicating estoppel on findings which had been
vacated, the second court deprived Bintliff of the benefit of his bar-
gain: the settlement premised on vacatur. Presumably, courts want
to avoid overriding private bargains between the parties. Second,
Chemetron opens the door for judicial reliance on previously erased
judgments. If vacatur based on postjudgment settlement does not
erase the vitality of a judgment, what about vacatur based on moot-
ness? Chemetron suggests that even in cases which implicate the
Munsingwear reasoning, a party could be bound by a decision he or
she was precluded from challenging on appeal. The approach sug-
157 Id at 1191 (quoting Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945) for the
principle that collateral estoppel does not require ajudgment "which ends the litigation
... and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment").
158 Id at 1198, 1201 (Reavley,J., dissenting).
159 Id at 1201.
160 Id.
161 See, e.g., Dodrill v. Ludt, 764 F.2d 442 (6th Cir. 1985). Recently, the Southern
District of New York considered whether it should follow Chemetron by giving collateral
estoppel effect to ajudgment which had been vacated pursuant to a postjudgment settle-
ment. In Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., 722
F. Supp. 998 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), the court noted that even though the Chemetron approach
would preserve judicial resources, the Nestle decision precluded its adoption.
"[V]irtually every other sentence in Judge Winter's opinion [in Nestle] suggests that liti-
gants prepared to settle may contract with impunity over the preclusive effects of their
dispute." Id at 1011.
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gested by Chemetron goes too far, disserving both the public and pri-
vate interests in efficiency, predictability, and finality.
Thus Chemetron does not offer a solution to the vacatur ques-
tion. A decision by the original court to vacate its judgment should
operate to destroy the collateral estoppel effect of that judgment.
Parties who demonstrate entitlement to vacatur-either by introduc-
ing evidence of unfairness or fraud surrounding the original deci-
sion or by establishing that the Munsingwear doctrine applies-
should not be bound by the vacated judgment.
The application of this rule, however, imposes a distinct cost on
vacatur-namely, that of destroying the collateral estoppel or res
judicata effect of the judgment. This cost is felt most directly by
other present or potential litigants who might otherwise be able to
make use of that decision. The cost associated with forcing these
parties to relitigate a previously decided issue is the most commonly
cited argument against vacatur.162
In addition to the private costs suffered by future litigants, relit-
igation imposes a cost on society163 -the cost of consuming scarce
162 It is unclear whether Nestle rejects as an appropriate basis for denying vacatur the
demonstrated prejudice to third parties of destroying the preclusive effect of the judg-
ment. Nestle suggests that such prejudice is too remote and speculative to be worthy of
judicial deference. See Nestle Co. v. Chester's Mkt., Inc., 756 F.2d 280, 284 (2d Cir.
1985) (describing the "plight of hypothetical future defendants facing hypothetical fu-
ture lawsuits"); see also Note, Settlement Pending Appeal, supra note 5, at 249-50 (suggesting
that the fear of relitigation expressed by opponents of vacatur is speculative and un-
founded). It is therefore difficult to tell what impact the presence of tangible third par-
ties who are demonstrably prejudiced by vacatur, such as the intervenors in National
Union, would have on members of the Nestle school.
163 At least one commentator has suggested that the relitigation costs associated
with vacatur are insubstantial and that this objection is therefore unfounded. See Note,
Settlement Pending Appeal, supra note 5, at 249-50. One problem with vacatur, however, is
the fact that vacating a prior judgment is a largely invisible step in the litigation process.
Most motions to vacate never result in a written opinion that might explain to future
litigants and the public the reasons behind the court's decision. In addition, both the
West Publishing System and the on-line Reporting Services (LEXIS and WESTLAW)
permit the courts to withdraw from publication opinions which have been vacated, leav-
ing the public with such scant guidance as the following:
EDrrOR's NoTE: The opinion of the United States District Court,
S.D.N.Y., Mason Tenders District Council Welfare Fund v. Akaty Construction
Corp., published in the advance sheet at this citation, 724 F. Supp. 209-
224, was withdrawn from the bound volume because opinion was vacated
and withdrawn by order of the Court.
Akaty, 724 F. Supp. at 209. Thus an attempt to research the relitigation of vacated deci-
sions is unlikely to reveal, for example, the fact that the case referred to above involved
the relitigation of an issue decided in an earlier opinion involving the same plaintiff. In
fact, the court in Akaty explicitly relied upon the opinion in the earlier case, Mason Ten-
ders District Council Welfare Fund v. Dalton, 648 F. Supp. 1309, vacated upon request of
the parties, 648 F. Supp. 1318 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). Akaty, 724 F. Supp. at 219 n.10. Due to
the fact that the Akaty opinion was withdrawn from publication and is available only in
the West advance sheets, the connection between the two lawsuits is likely to remain
permanently obscured.
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judicial resources to litigate an issue a second time.164 The inter-
venors in National Union cited this cost as a reason for denying Na-
tional Union's motion to vacate.' 65 They argued that the trial
court's judgment, if not vacated, could have a preclusive effect in
subsequent litigation between National Union and them.' 66
Though it did not decide the issue of what preclusive effect the
lower court's judgment might have, the Ninth Circuit recognized
that this potential preclusive effect imposed a significant enough
cost to warrant denial of the motion to vacate. 167
Commentators have suggested that giving preclusive effect to
the judgment in an action which has been settled is unfair to the
losing party.' 68 Two arguments have been raised in support of this
claim. The first is that settlement is a private bargain between the
parties and that the court has no right to become involved in that
bargain. The parties should be free to settle their dispute on any
terms upon which they agree, and if the terms include vacatur, a
court which refuses to vacate is interfering with the settlement pro-
cess. The problem with this argument is that it views the settlement
process with tunnel vision. The very reason the parties seek the aid
of the court in vacatur is their inability, through the settlement pro-
164 The argument is that vacatur allows a party to relitigate the same issue as long as
a supply of new defendants holds out. Giving collateral estoppel effect to the original
judgment prevents the losing party from wasting scarce judicial resources on the same
issue.
165 The court in National Union had the benefit of direct information on the preclu-
sive affect of the trial court's judgment, because the third parties who would be affected
by vacatur had intervened in order to oppose vacatur. National Union Fire Ins. Co. v.
Seafirst Corp., 891 F.2d 762, 764 (9th Cir. 1989). This situation is atypical; it is rare that
third parties who might benefit from the preclusive effect of ajudgment will learn of the
threat to the judgment in time to make their presence known to the court. The court's
decision on a motion to vacate should not depend on the presence of such third parties
before the court. Cf Martin v. Wilks, 109 S. Ct. 2180, 2185 (1989) (citing Chase Nat'l
Bank v. Norwalk, 291 U.S. 431, 441 (1934)) (the law does not require voluntary inter-
vention by nonparties to preserve their legal rights).
166 National Union, 891 F.2d at 764. Indeed, subsequent courts found that the trial
court's judgment in National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Seafirst Corp., No. C85-396R
(W.D. Wash. 1988) barred claims by National Union against Seafirst's attorneys. See
Davis, Wright & Jones v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 709 F. Supp. 196 (W.D. Wash.
1989), aft'd, 897 F.2d 1021 (9th Cir. 1990); National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Davis,
Wright, Todd, Reise &Jones, 157 A.D.2d 571, 551 N.Y.S.2d 774 (1990).
167 The National Union court noted that the third-party interests in maintaining the
preclusive effect of the prior judgment were legitimate, opining that the cost of destroy-
ing that preclusive effect was high:
Given the third-party interests in this case and the possible, although
uncertain status of any preclusive effect, the district court did not abuse
its discretion in denying the motion to vacate .... To the extent there
may be preclusive effect, National Union should not be able to avoid
those effects through settlement and dismissal of the appeal.
National Union, 891 F.2d at 769.
168 See, e.g., Note, supra note 100.
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cess, to bind third parties to the terms of the agreement. The fact
that there are third parties involved who are affected by vacatur
demonstrates that the dispute is not a purely private matter between
the two parties to the settlement. 6
9
A second and more troubling argument advanced against giv-
ing preclusive effect to judgments after settlement is the possibility
that a party may be unfairly bound by a judgment that is in some
way weak or defective, but has not been appealed due to settle-
ment.1 70 Thus, collateral estoppel effect is being given to a judg-
ment that may be erroneous.' 7 '
Many settlements are really compromise verdicts, in which par-
ties compensate for perceived weaknesses in the prevailing party's
case by settling for an amount much less than the initial judg-
ment. 72 Moreover, the initial judgment, although adverse, may be
so small as to make it economically unwise for the loser to appeal,
even if the prospects of success on appeal are substantial. Finally, a
single adverse judgment may represent an aberration, particularly in
repetitive or multi-party litigation.' 73 It might be unfair for courts
to prevent a party who has won twenty-five lawsuits on the same
issue174 from buying his way out of an adverse judgment in the
169 Thus a rule against postjudgment vacatur may be more appropriately analogized
to the general rule that "parties who choose to resolve litigation through settlement may
not dispose of the claims of a third party... without that party's agreement." Local 93,
Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 529 (1986).
170 See Note, Avoiding Issue Preclusion, supra note 5, at 869.
171 The concept that a judgment can or will be clearly erroneous is, of course, sub-
ject to some debate. Some scholars believe that there is no correct or incorrect outcome
in litigation. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, The Death of the Law?, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 12
(1986) (discussing the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement and the CLS perception
that a judgment represents a choice rather than a "right answer"). Even those who
believe that a judgment can be clearly incorrect recognize that the litigation process
tends to weed out those cases in which a correct outcome is readily ascertainable. Con-
sequently, those cases which proceed through trial to final judgment are frequently
those in which there are no "clearly rightful winners." See Dalton, supra note 25, at 73-
74. The notion that relitigation allows error correction is meaningless if there is no
unambiguously correct outcome.
172 See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 333
n.26 (1971) (recognizing possibility that thejudgment in the first suit was a compromise
verdict as one element of unfairness).
173 See Currie, supra note 19, at 285-89.
174 An illustration of this issue can be found in the cigarette litigation. After over 30
years of litigation, wherein the tobacco industry successfully defended itself against
some 334 claims without paying a single penny in damages, a New Jersey jury recently
returned the first verdict in which the tobacco industry was found liable and awarded
$400,000 in damages. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541, 546 (3d Cir.
1990); see also Note, After Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.: How Wide Will the Floodgates of
Cigarette Litigation Open?, 38 Am. U.L. REV. 1021, 1022 n.7 (1989) (authored by Douglas
N. Jacobson). Although the Court of Appeals overturned the jury verdict in Cipollone,
the verdict raised the question of whether the industry would now be subject to numer-




One possible solution is to vacate decisions in which these is-
sues are raised or, alternatively, to vacate routinely when a case is
settled pending appeal. This solution suffers from two flaws. First,
the elements which may militate against giving a judgment preclu-
sive effect may not be readily ascertainable at the time of the initial
vacatur decision. It may be unclear, for example, whether binding a
party in a subsequent action will be unfair without knowing the
claims alleged in that subsequent action, the prevalence of common
issues of law or fact, and the existence and resolution of other re-
lated litigation. The court in the original Munsingwear decision, for
example, might not have been able to anticipate the government's
decision to reprosecute Munsingwear for essentially the same viola-
tions during a different time period.
Second, the elements of unfairness identified by the commenta-
tors are not unique to the application of collateral estoppel after
settlement. The expansion of the doctrine of collateral estoppel to
situations in which mutuality is absent, the offensive use of collateral
estoppel by subsequent "free-riders," and the risk that a party may
be bound by a judgment in an action in which he or she lacked the
incentives to defend vigorously, are issues common to the applica-
tion of collateral estoppel outside the settlement context. Indeed,
both the Supreme Court decisions which so expanded the doctrine
and the commentary which followed those decisions identified these
objections.1 76 Despite the possible validity of these objections, the
Supreme Court determined that the economies provided by preclu-
sion outweigh such concerns.
Moreover, although the initial court's decision to vacate should
175 The reference is to Professor Currie's famous railroad example. See Currie, supra
note 19. Whether this result is unfair depends on the reasons why the litigant was un-
successful in the 26th suit. Was there a distinction in the factual evidence presented?
Was there a change in the applicable law? The use of offensive collateral estoppel in the
area of mass tort litigation has been widely discussed. Many commentators believe that
subjects such as asbestos litigation, the DES cases, and the Dalkon shield litigation are
ideal for the application of offensive collateral estoppel to reduce issues and expendi-
tures in these multiple-plaintiff lawsuits. See Green, supra note 20, at 144-45 & accompa-
nying notes. Professor Green explains the complexity of applying collateral estoppel in
the area of asbestos litigation. In particular, this complexity results from the difficulty in
both ascertaining whether the prior case (upon which a subsequent claimant wishes to
rely) was fairly decided and dealing with a multitude of inconsistent or partially inconsis-
tent verdicts. Id. at 200-07. Green concludes that differences in factual issues as well as
concerns about the reliability of the first verdict limit the utility of collateral estoppel in
this area. Id. at 216.
176 See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 330-31 (1979); Blonder-
Tongue, 402 U.S. at 333-34; Kurt Erlenbach, Offensive Collateral Estoppel and Products Liabil-
ity: Reasoning with the Unreasonable, 14 ST. MARY'S LJ. 19 (1982) (surveying fairness issues
raised by the application of offensive collateral estoppel in products liability cases).
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prevent the preclusive use of the initial judgment, the decision to
deny vacatur need not mandate the application of collateral estop-
pel. A subsequent court must nonetheless find that the necessary
predicates for preclusion are present, which includes a finding that
the losing party had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the matter
in the initial action and that application of preclusion would not be
fundamentally unfair.177 The court has the discretion to refuse to
apply preclusion if these prerequisites are not met and indeed can
reasonably find that the situations identified above create precisely
the kind of unfairness that justifies such a refusal.
B. Other Collateral Consequences
Although estoppel is probably the most significant collateral
impact of an adverse decision, it is not the only one. In ruling on a
motion to vacate, the court must consider other substantial costs. 178
One of these costs concerns the extra-judicial effect of a judicial de-
cision. A judgment does not result simply in a prevailing party and
a losing party; it affects the parties' substantive rights. Much civil
litigation does not focus on a two-party contract dispute in which
the effect of litigation is felt exclusively by the parties thereto.
Rather, civil litigation serves to correct unfair or corrupt practices,
remedy tortious wrongs, and resolve quasi-public issues such as
trademark and patent protection. Therefore, the resolution of liti-
gation may have external effects which extend beyond the parties to
the lawsuit. Even in a case in which there are no present or future
litigants waiting in the wings to benefit from the decision,1 79 the
public may benefit at the expense of the losing litigant.'80
177 Indeed, the Court in Blonder-Tongue specifically suggested that one possible situa-
tion in which it would be unfair to apply preclusion is where there is a possibility that the
judgment in the first suit was a compromise verdict. Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 333
n.26.
178 For a comparison of the collateral consequences of an adverse criminal judg-
ment, see Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 55 (1968) ("[M]ost criminal convictions do
in fact entail adverse collateral legal consequences. The mere 'possibility' that this will
be the case is enough to preserve a criminal case from ending 'ignominiously in the
limbo of mootness.'" (footnote omitted)).
179 Of course, potential future litigants may receive a more direct benefit from a
judgment than simply the right to use it as collateral estoppel in a future lawsuit. A sex
discrimination suit which results in a finding of a discriminatory environment will benefit
not only the plaintiff but other employees who have been victims of discrimination in the
workplace. Even if the plaintiff settles his or her monetary claim after judgment, the
finding of a discriminatory environment is likely to result in remedial action, whether
mandated judicially, administratively, or otherwise.
180 An example of the collateral effect of an adverse judgment is described in Note,
Settlement Pending Appeal, supra note 5, at 243. The author describes a hypothetical in
which a corporate defendant loses a tort action for illegal dumping of toxic waste. The
defendant's reputation in the local community will be severely damaged unless the de-
fendant is able to escape the ramifications of the judgment.
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The Nestle case provides an example of these external effects.
The Nestle Company sought relief from the lower court's finding
that "toll house" was a generic 8" term and therefore not subject to
federal trademark protection.'8 2 The trial court decision held that
the public, including Nestle's competitors, could freely use the toll
house name. In so holding, the court ordered the term to be re-
moved from the federal register of trademarks.' 8 3
By vacating the judgment, the Second Circuit allowed Nestle to
continue to claim trademark protection for the term "toll houpe."
Assuming that the toll house name was valuable (which it presuma-
bly was, based on Nestle's strong desire for trademark protection),
the free use of the toll house name would have had real conse-
quences1 84 in the economic market for chocolate chip cookies.'
8 5
Sanctioning public use of the term allows other manufacturers to
enhance their competition with Nestle at a much lower cost. Al-
lowing Nestle to keep the term registered as a trademark, in con-
trast, effectively means that competitors not wishing to pursue
litigation must choose a different, possibly less suitable, name for
their product-a choice which significantly raises the market cost of
competition.
181 See Nestle Co. v. Chester's Mkt., Inc., 756 F.2d 280, 281 (2d Cir. 1985). A ge-
neric word is the ordinary name by which a product or category of products is described
in the market. Frequently, a name which is first used as a trademark becomes a generic
name after the public associates the name with the generic product rather than the par-
ticular manufacturer. See, e.g., Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 116-17
(1938) (explanation of why the term "shredded wheat" is generic and cannot be
trademarked).
182 Specifically, this protection is provided under the Lanham Act (the Trademark
Act of 1946), ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127
(1988)), and the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat.
3935 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1988)). Commentators have styled this ex-
clusive right "language monopoly." See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richrd A. Posner,
Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 292 (1987).
183 Nestle, 756 F.2d at 281. Once a mark becomes generic, section 143 of the Lan-
ham Act provides for its cancellation. 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (1988). For further explana-
tion, see Ralph H. Folsom & Larry L. Teply, Trademarked Generic Words, 89 YALE LJ. 1323
(1980).
184 These consequences are not unique to the Nestle case. The Blonder-Tongue court
recognized that the determination of patent validity "raises issues significant to the pub-
lic as well as to the named parties." Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of Ill.
Found., 402 U.S. 313, 331 n.21. Indeed, the willingness of courts to grant postsettle-
ment vacatur seriously jeopardizes the operation of the markets for intellectual prop-
erty. See Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Dethroning Lear: Licensee Estoppel and the Incentive to
Innovate, 72 VA. L. REv. 677, 694-705 (1986).
185 Readers who are unimpressed with the significance of a free market for chocolate
chip cookies may take refuge in the many cases in this area in which litigation concerns
public access to products of substantially more importance. See, e.g., Pharmacia, Inc. v.
Frigitronics, Inc., No. 84-1923-K (D. Mass. Jan. 17, 1990 & Feb. 2, 1990) (recognizing
public interest in continued availability of chemical products for medical treatment in
spite ofjudicial finding of likelihood of patent infringement).
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In addition, Nestle's resolution put nonlitigant competitors in an
even worse position than if there had been no litigation. Not only
did the "toll house" name continue to receive trademark protection,
but the former defendant Saccone, through the benefit of the settle-
ment agreement, was able to negotiate a trademark license agree-
ment. 8 6 By virtue of this agreement, Saccone was entitled to use
the toll house name. Thus Saccone obtained an enhanced competi-
tive position 8 7 over third-party nonlitigants. 88
Certain kinds of litigation which result in findings of illegality
have a clear public benefit. An example in this category is litigation
challenging the legality of a corporation's poison pill or other anti-
takeover device in connection with tender offers. An anti-takeover
device may be illegal because it has been adopted without sufficient
disclosure to stockholders or provision for stockholder vote, be-
cause it conflicts with the corporation's charter, or because it vio-
lates state or federal law.' 89 Such a device does not suddenly
become legal when a prospective purchaser drops its challenge; the
remaining public stockholders continue to be burdened with the il-
legality. Yet vacatur may completely erase the court's finding of ille-
gality, effectively sanctioning the device for continued use pending
future challenge.
Tender offer litigation in particular is notorious for its failure to
proceed through the full appellate process. Often described as stra-
tegic litigation,190 it frequently results in a round of motions for pre-
liminary relief or summary judgment. Once rulings on those
186 Nestle Co. v. Chester's Mkt., Inc., 596 F. Supp. 1445, 1446 (D. Conn. 1984).
187 See Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 346 (a manufacturer which obtains a favorable
judgment or settlement is at a competitive advantage over nonlitigant competitors).
188 The district court in Nestle recognized this impact. The court noted that the ef-
fect of vacatur would be to require future competitors who wished to use the toll house
name to relitigate whether the term was generic. Such litigation would entail significant
cost, a cost other competitors might be unwilling to incur. See Nestle, 596 F. Supp. at
1455. Professor Dreyfuss recognizes the serious effect that a settlement and license
agreement can have on the intellectual property market. Dreyfuss, supra note 184, at
694-705, explains that the patent licensee loses the incentive to challenge the validity of
a patent upon entering into a license agreement and thereafter has as strong an incen-
tive as the original patentee to avoid challenges to the patent's validity, as he and the
original owner are the only ones with a legal right of use. Thus, settlement will not only
remove the initial finding of invalidity, but can make it more difficult to challenge the
patent successfully.
189 See, e.g., Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace, Inc., 744 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1984); Minstar
Acquiring Corp. v. AMF, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1252 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Asarco, Inc. v. Court,
611 F. Supp. 468 (D.NJ. 1985). See generally Note, Shareholder Rights Plans: Shields or
Gavels?, 42 VAND. L. REV. 173 (1989); Note, Discrimination Against Shareholders in Opposing a
Hostile Takeover, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1319 (1986).
190 See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited Reflections on Recent
Developments in Delaware's Corporate Law, 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 913, 923-41 (1982); Michael
Rosenzweig, Target Litigation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 110 (1986).
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motions have clarified the bargaining positions of the parties, the
cases are settled out of court. Consequently, if parties insist on va-
catur as part of the settlement process, any clarification of the stock-
holders' legal rights that has resulted from the frequently quite
costly litigation will be removed. 19 1
To illustrate, in Policemen and Firemen Retirement System v. Income
Opportunity Realty Trust,192 the court found that the defendant Trust's
purchase rights plan/poison pill was illegal. Plaintiffs, two public
trust funds, then settled the litigation with an agreement that the
Trust repurchase their shares. The settlement agreement included
a provision requiring that the court's findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law, including the illegality of the poison pill, be vacated.
The district court entered an appropriate order without comment.
The settlement thus precluded other public stockholders from ben-
efitting from the judicial finding that the poison pill was illegal.
A famous example of judicial use of a subsequent decision for
purposes other than collateral estoppel is presented in SEC v. Glenn
W. Turner Enterprises, Inc. 193 Glenn W. Turner Enterprises was found
guilty of securities fraud in an enterprise involving the sale of self-
improvement courses. The Ninth Circuit stated in its opinion:
"The trial court's findings.., demonstrate that defendants' scheme
is a gigantic and successful fraud."' 94  Subsequently, the SEC
brought suit in the Fifth Circuit against a subsidiary of Glenn Tur-
ner for securities fraud arising out of a cosmetics enterprise-SEC v.
Koscot Interplanetary, Inc. 195 The enterprise was different in the sec-
ond case, and therefore collateral estoppel did not apply. The Fifth
Circuit benefitted, however, from the Ninth Circuit's opinion includ-
ing its findings as to the method of operation employed by the
Glenn Turner companies. 196 According to the Fifth Circuit:
Our task is greatly simplified by the Ninth Circuit's decision
in SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., supra. The promo-
tional scheme confronting the Ninth Circuit is largely paralleled
191 Unless the settlement requires the tender offeror to reimburse the target com-
pany for its attorney's fees, the cost of tender offer litigation including expedited pro-
ceedings, extensive discovery, and the most expensive legal talent will be borne by the
target company. As a result, the target's stockholders indirectly pay for these "strate-
gic" legal battles.
192 No. C-89-1152 (AJZ) (N.D. Cal. May 16, 1989).
193 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973).
194 Id at 478.
195 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974).
196 It should be noted that it was the Ninth Circuit's opinion that was of value to the
Fifth Circuit. A decision by the Ninth Circuit to vacate its judgment in Glenn Turner but
not to vacate the opinion would have preserved the stare decisis effect that was of use to.
the later court.
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by that exposed before this court. 19 7
Thus, even though the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Glenn Turner lacked
collateral estoppel effect, it had other collateral consequences of
public value.
An unsuccessful civil litigant may also suffer direct and serious
consequences which extend beyond the judgment itself. Statutes
and regulations governing filing, disclosure, and licensing fre-
quently recognize the significance of an adverse civil judgment by
requiring disclosure of certain such judgments. For example, in
some filings required by the federal securities laws, filing parties
must disclose adverse civil judgments involving injunctions or viola-
tions of the federal or state securities laws.1 98 An adverse civil judg-
ment may also prevent an applicant from registering as a broker-
dealer under the federal securities laws.199 In addition, a civil judg-
ment based on a finding of willful violation of the federal securities
laws might furnish the basis for a Rule 2(e)200 proceeding or even
for disbarment. 20
1
Consideration of the consequences of erasing such judicial de-
cisions illustrates the public cost of vacatur. It is certainly arguable
that vacated judgments should be disclosed under federal securities
laws. Disclosure is probably not legally mandated, however, since
the vacated judgment "is of no further force and effect." 20 2 Accord-
197 Koscot, 497 F.2d at 484.
198 See Instructions to Schedule 13D, 13E-3, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13d-101 to .13e-100
(1990).
199 In particular, 17 C.F.R. § 249.501a requires applicants for registration as a bro-
ker-dealer to file SEC Form BD. In completing this form, the applicant must disclose,
inter alia, whether it has ever been found to be "involved in a violation of investment-
related statutes or regulations." Form BD; Question B(2). Section 15(b)(4) of the Se-
curities Exchange Act permits the SEC to deny or revoke registration if it finds that an
applicant has willfully violated the federal securities laws. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(A)-(F)
(1990). See, e.g., Capital Funds, Inc. v. SEC, 348 F.2d 582 (8th Cir. 1965) (upholding
SEC's decision to deny registration as a broker-dealer based on applicants' previous
violation of the securities laws).
200 Rule 2(e) of the SEC Rules of Practice provides:
The Commission may deny, temporarily or permanently, the privilege of
appearing or practicing before it in any way to any person who is found
by the Commission after notice of and opportunity for hearing in the
matter (i) not to possess the requisite qualifications to represent others,
or (ii) to be lacking in character or integrity or to have engaged in unethi-
cal or improper professional conduct.
17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1990).
201 Cf. In the Matter of Paul M. Kaufman, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3-
2113 (July 2, 1970).
202 For example, the Instructions to SEC Schedule 13D, Item 1(e) require the filing
party to disclose:
Whether or not, during the last five years, such person was a party to a
civil proceeding of a judicial or administrative body of competent juris-
diction and as a result of such proceeding was or is subject to ajudgment,
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ingly, a litigant who successfully obtains vacatur may be spared the
burden of disclosure, the difficulty of obtaining registration, and all
other collateral consequences of an adverse decision.
C. Additional Public Costs of Vacatur
In addition to having party-specific impacts, postjudgment va-
catur may sacrifice certain public values. 20 3 A balancing of the costs
of settlement against the costs of vacatur must weigh these values as
well. The most commonly cited public value is the precedential
value of the prior decision. 20 4 A judgment includes elements of
legal analysis which may have important consequences in other
cases involving unrelated parties. For this reason, judicial decisions
are published in case reporters. 205 The common-law legal system in
the United States is based on the premise that previously decided
cases have a public value in elucidating the law for future actors, as
decree or final order enjoining future violations of ... or finding any
violation with respect to [federal or state securities laws].
17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1990).
203 These values are impacted even more when a court vacates its judgment but
leaves the opinion intact. See supra note 28.
204 Though limited precedential value is an effect of vacatur, it is unlikely that this
effect imposes a substantial societal cost. Most vacatur decisions occur at the district
court level, where a decision has limited, if any, precedential value anyway. To the ex-
tent that a decision represents a groundbreaking legal analysis, such a decision can be
cited for its persuasive impact even if vacated. See, e.g., County of Los Angles v. Davis,
440 U.S. 625, 646 n.10 (1979) (Powell,J., dissenting) (vacated opinion continues to have
precedential weight if not reversed on the merits); Holliday v. Consol. Rail Corp., 914
F.2d 421, 423 (3d Cir. 1990); Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 870 F.2d
1292, 1298 (7th Cir. 1989) (citing a vacated decision as "the most comprehensive source
of guidance available on the [questions at issue]"); United States ev rel Espinoza v. Fair-
man, 813 F.2d 117, 125 n.7 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1010 (1987) (relying on
analysis of decision vacated by Supreme Court as persuasive precedent); see also Note,
Settlement Pending Appeal, supra note 5, at 246 n.91. But see Mason Tenders Dist. Council
Welfare Fund v. Akaty Constr. Corp., 724 F. Supp. 209, 219 n.10 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (rely-
ing on vacated decision not because of its precedential value but because the prior
judge's analysis was "thorough, incisive and ultimately persuasive"), opinion withdrawn
from bound volume at request of the court.
205 Those scholars who contend that the utility of published decisions is limited to
decisions of appellate courts might reconsider upon recollecting the large number of
trial court opinions which are published annually. See, e.g., JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN &
DAVID S. CLARK, COMPARATIVE LAW: WESTERN EUROPEAN AND LATIN AMERICAN LEGAL
SYSTEMS 585 (1978) ("T]he extent to which and the manner in which judicial decisions
are published and made available for use in research reflect their true position and func-
tion in the legal system."); H. Miles Foy, III, Some Reflections on Legislation, Adjudication,
and Implied Private Actions in the State and Federal Courts, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 501, 508-09
n.25 (1986) (reporting and publication ofjudicial opinions permit development and en-
forcement of stare decisis doctrine); William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, The
Non-Precedential Precedent-Limited Publication and No-Citation Rules in the United States Courts
of Appeals, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1167, 1181-85 (1978) (published decisions and the role of
stare decisis establish the content of the law itself).
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well as for future litigants. 20 6
Indeed, one of the social values of litigation is the resolution of
uncertainty in the law. This resolution is important not merely for
its legal effect in subsequent lawsuits, but for its social impact as
well. 20 7 Judicial decisions influence our perception of what is right
and wrong. A decision like that in Brown v. Board of Education20 8 de-
cides more than the issue of the legality of a segregated public
school system in Kansas.20 9
Although a vacated decision may remain in the case report-
ers, 210 its precedential value is extremely limited. One reason for
this is the difficulty of determining the basis for the decision to va-
cate. As discussed previously, a court may vacate a decision for
many reasons that go to the actual validity of the decision, such as
fraud, mistake, or newly discovered evidence. A litigant citing a va-
cated decision cannot be sure that the court did not vacate based on
second thoughts about the legitimacy of the legal rulings. No gui-
dance exists for subsequent courts as to the reasons for vacatur, and
accordingly, courts view vacated decisions with suspicion.
2 1'
206 Part of the justification for public financing of the judicial system is the public
value derived from the resolution of private disputes. Indeed, commentators have re-
cently begun to question the legitimacy of shielding disputes resolved through settle-
ment from public scrutiny. Such commentators argue that maintaining the secrecy of a
settlement has adverse impacts upon other similarly situated actors and upon the pub-
lic's right to know. See Elizabeth Kolbert, ChiefJudge of New York Urges Less Secrecy in Civil
Settlements, N.Y. Times, June 20, 1990, at Al, col. 3 (N.Y. ChiefJudge Sol Wachtler and
others advocate giving the public greater access to the records of civil cases which have
been settled. "'I think that when you have the courts being used for redressing a
wrong, it is the public that is providing and paying for the court procedure and making it
available for private litigants.'" Id. at Al, col. 4 (quoting ChiefJudge Wachtler)).
207 An untested law or legal theory may have a chilling effect on the actions of nonli-
tigants. Thus the cost of forgoing a judicial interpretation of that law may include the
costs associated with restraint of conduct because of its uncertain legality. See Don B.
Kates, Jr. & William T. Barker, Mootness in Judicial Proceedings: Toward a Coherent Theory, 62
CALIF. L. REv. 1385, 1429-31 (1974) (arguing that these social costs are particularly high
when the issues involve personal liberties, freedom of expression, or entitlement to so-
cial welfare benefits).
208 347 U.S. 483 (1954), supplemented by 349 U.S. 294 (1955). Brown is clearly an
extreme example; most decisions lack its social significance. The constitutional law text-
books are replete, however, with cases which have revised social consciousness. See, e.g.,
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion rights); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965) (constitutional right to privacy); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)
(free exercise of religion).
209 Professor Fiss describes Brown as a case "in which the judicial power is used to
eradicate the caste structure." Fiss, supra note 8, at 1089.
210 A case vacated prior to publication of the bound reporter volume will generally
be omitted from that volume, causing that case to appear only in the advance sheets.
211 Courts could resolve this problem by stating explicitly the grounds for vacatur
whenever they grant a motion to vacate, as they currently do when cases become unre-




In Memorial Hospital, Judge Easterbrook cites a public interest in
the respect for and integrity of the courts.212 Finality of judgments
is an important component of the credibility of the judicial process.
A perception that a party with sufficient resources can manipulate
the finality ofjudgments fosters a diminished respect for the institu-
tion which allows such manipulation.2 13 To the extent that courts
sanction the use of settlement conditioned on vacatur and provide
automatic vacatur on demand, few rational litigants are likely to de-
cline the invitation. With vacatur as a routine procedure, the trial is
converted from a method of dispute resolution into a first-round
estimate of the parties' rights-a sort of nonbinding arbitration. 214
Equally important is Judge Easterbrook's concern that public
acts by public officials become bargaining chips in the settlement
negotiation. 215 Such a result engenders disrespect for the judicial
process. In addition, it allows parties to avoid adverse decisions
based on the financial ability to buy their way out.216 This practice
takes the New Yorker cartoon query, "How much justice can you
afford?," 217 to a new level. If ajudicial system in which the rights of
the parties are likely to depend more on their finances than on legal
merit is to be condemned, a system in which wealthy litigants can
use the process simply as a nonbinding gambling procedure is
equally abhorrent.
Advocates of the public law model of litigation recognize that
private litigation may have socially valuable consequences. These
consequences may be recognized less as a cost to the losing litigant
than as a boon to society through the acceptance of change in our
social structure. 218 The value of certain judicial decisions to society
212 Memorial Hosp. v. United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 862 F.2d
1299, 1302 (7th Cir. 1988).
213 Moreover, because of the largely invisible nature of the vacatur process and the
fact that vacated decisions may be physically removed from the record books, see supra
note 163, the practice of permitting vacatur assumes the guise of a furtive tool for re-
movingjudicial facts from public scrutiny.
214 The judgment does have a real effect on the legal entitlements of the parties; this
effect will require the party desiring vacatur to pay for it. The relevant distinction is not
between the parties' positions before and after a judgment is rendered, but between
litigants who have negotiated a contractual resolution of their legal rights and those who
have had those rights resolved by judicial decree.
215 Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d at 1302.
216 In effect, the parties have obtained a highly authoritative advisory opinion at
public expense.
217 J.B. Handelsman, THE NEw YORKER, Dec. 24, 1973, at 52 (caption to cartoon
showing lawyer with potential client: "You have a pretty good case, Mr. Pitkin. How
much justice can you afford?").
218 Some view litigation as a negative sum game, meaning that the overall utility
value of a lawsuit is negative, because one party's gain is the other party's loss, assuming
both parties expend litigation costs. See, e.g., Thomas E. Kauper & Edward A. Snyder,
An Inquiry into the Efficiency of Private Antitrust Enforcement: Follow-on and Independently Initi-
1991)
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as a whole may far exceed the cost to the individual losing litigant in
the action. Thus, a court does a disservice when it decides to vacate
based solely on an analysis of the individual litigants' costs and
benefits.
IV
THE COST OF VACATUR IN THE SETTLEMENT PROCESS
Judge Easterbrook's concern about the use of vacatur as a bar-
gaining chip is worthy of further exploration, especially in view of
the perception of courts, such as the Nestle court, that the public
value of encouraging settlement is furthered by allowing vacatur at
the parties' request.
A. The Economic Model of the Settlement Decision
As commentators have observed, 21 9 the decision of a litigant to
settle rather than continue to trial is based on a process of evaluat-
ing litigation as an investment opportunity. More specifically, the
settlement decision is based on an evaluation of the expected judg-
ment and the cost of securing that judgment, weighed against the
value of the proposed settlement. The litigant evaluates the deci-
sion to settle based on his or her expected financial condition at the
conclusion of the litigation. This may be described as a function of
the expected judgment, the probability of obtaining that judgment,
and the costs of obtaining that judgment. Assuming that the costs
of litigating are independent of the litigation result,220 the outcome
may be quantified as:
V = X p(n)J(n) - c(t), where
V = the expected value to be obtained at the conclusion of the
litigation;22
1
ated Cases Compared, 74 GEO. L.J. 1163, 1170 (1986). This view of the litigation process is
overly simplistic, because it focuses on straightforward disputes over money damages
and does not consider the costs and values of injunctive and other equitable relief.
Moreover, the public law model recognizes that, through the vehicle of social change,
litigation may have a positive value to society.
219 See sources cited supra note 21.
220 This assumption, although useful in order to simplify the analysis, is concededly
unrealistic. The costs of litigating clearly bear a direct relationship to the expected judg-
ment. For example, obtaining damages for loss of expected earnings may be impossible
without the introduction of expert testimony. The costs of litigating are more accurately
represented as c(n)(t), the further litigation cost of obtaining a particular judgment J(n)
at time t. For simplicity's sake, the analysis in this Article will ignore the possibility that
costs may vary as a function of the expected judgment.
221 This value need not be viewed simply in terms of a damage remedy. This
formula may also describe litigation seeking equitable relief, with the value in such a
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J(n) = the range of possible judgments, with eachJ being one possi-
ble judgment;
p(n) = the probability of obtaining a given judgment J(n); and
c(t) = the cost of continuing to pursue the litigation to its conclu-
sion at any given time t (rather than settling or voluntarily discontin-
uing the lawsuit).
The progress of any litigation can be viewed as the continued
acquisition of additional information about the probability of
achieving the various possible judgments. Thus, as a litigant goes
through the discovery process, his assessment of the values of p(l)
through p(n) changes, and his assessment of the value of his claim
may also change. 222
A rational litigant223 will settle a lawsuit if, at any point during
the lawsuit, he has the opportunity to settle for an amount greater
than or equal to V. Because the calculation of V by each litigant is
independent, there may, in a lawsuit, be a range of amounts for
which both litigants would be willing to settle. Conversely, it is pos-
sible that the litigants' expectations as to the outcome of the litiga-
tion are so different that there is no settlement amount acceptable
to both of them.
To take a simple example, assume that plaintiff (P) and defen-
dant (D) are litigating a products liability claim. P's complaint al-
leges $100,000 in damages. D has interposed no counterclaims and
there is no prospect of punitive damages. The range of possible
judgments at the outset of the case is $0 to $100,000. Based on his
initial evaluation, P may assign a probability of 25% to full recovery,
a probability of 50% to obtaining a judgment of $50,000, and a
case representing the cost or benefit of such relief. For example, a party seeking to have
a trademark registration declared invalid may expect a declaration of invalidity to be
worth $500,000, representing perhaps a savings in licensing fees. If the trademark is
upheld, the party's expected value of the litigation is zero.
222 The calculation performed by the other litigant is identical. Ajudgment in favor
of a litigant's adversary may be reflected as a negative number. For example, if defen-
dant calculates that plaintiff will obtain a judgment of $100,000, then defendant will
insert this in his calculation as -$100,000. It should be noted that the litigants' estimates
of relative probability of various outcomes may not coincide. Thus, the plaintiff may
believe his chances of recovery are good, and may set the probability of obtaining a
$100,000 recovery at 50%. The defendant may believe there is no merit to plaintiff's
claims. Accordingly, the defendant may estimate the probability of a $100,000 judg-
ment in the plaintiff's favor at 5%.
223 Of course, a litigant may have personal characteristics which affect this decision.
If, for example, a litigant is risk averse, he will prefer an action which achieves $1000
with 100% probability to an action which achieves $1000 of expected value, based on a
50% probability of acquiring $2000 and a 50% probability of acquiring nothing. A risk
averse litigant will therefore be inclined to settle at some amount lower than V (i.e., the
expected value to be obtained at the conclusion of litigation), based on his perception
that a bird in the hand is worth more than two or more birds in the bush. Other factors
such as insurance coverage may also affect the decision to settle.
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probability of 25% to obtaining a judgment of $0. Further assume
that P expects to spend $5000 on the discovery and pretrial process
and an additional $5000 if the case goes to trial. A rational P would
be willing to settle at the outset of the litigation for $40,000, which
is the sum of p(n)J(n) - $10,000.224
D's calculation of expected outcome may be different. Indeed,
at the outset of litigation, D may believe there is zero probability of
ajudgment of $100,000, only a 40% probability of a $50,000 judg-
ment, and a large probability (60%) that the plaintiff will be com-
pletely unsuccessful. Assuming that it will also cost D $10,000 to
litigate, D may then calculate the expected outcome as -$30,000.
Since D will not offer more in settlement than his calculation of the
expected outcome, D and P will be unable to settle at this time.
Proceeding through the discovery process may change P's cal-
culation, however. Through reviewing documents and taking depo-
sitions, P may learn that his chance of recovering $100,000 is in fact
zero, and that he is much more likely to recovery only $25,000. P
may be forced to reevaluate and may discover that his expected re-
covery will be only $20,000.225 P will now be willing to settle for a
lower amount than at the start of the litigation. If D has not
changed his calculations,226 there is a range of settlement amounts
for which agreement is possible-$20,000 to $25,000.227
As the litigation proceeds and discovery provides more infor-
mation about the relative strengths and weaknesses of each party's
224 The calculation goes as follows:
J(1) = $100,000 p(1) = .25 c(t) = 10,000 where tI is
J(2) = $50,000 p(2) = .50 the outset of the litigation
J(3) = $0 p(3) = .25
.25($100,000) + .50($50,000) + .25($0) - $5000 - $5000 = $40,000
If the calculation is made at a subsequent point in the litigation, the expected cost c(t) of
bringing the litigation to a conclusion will decrease by the amount already spent. Thus
if P considers settlement after expending $5000 in litigation costs, c(2) will equal $5000.
P will add that expenditure to his equation. Therefore, P will not settle for less than
$45,000.
225 That figure assumes that P's discovery process reveals the following:
J(1) = $100,000 p(l) = 0
J(2) = $50,000 p(2) = .25
J(3) = $0 p(3) = .25
J(4) = $25,000 p(4) = .50
The calculation is as follows:
0($100,000) + .25($50,000) + .25($0) + .50($25,000) - $5,000* = $20,000
* the cost of proceeding from the present stage to the conclusion of the litigation.
226 Note that D's expected outcome must now reflect the expenditure of $5000 in
expected litigation costs, so that V = .40(-$50,000) + .60($0) - $5000 = -$25,000.
227 This scenario may be complicated by the fact that a party's settlement negotia-
tion is based not only on his expectation of the value of the litigation, but on his assess-
ment of the other party's bargaining position. Thus, a party's perception of the other




case, both parties will probably be able to ascertain the expected
outcome with greater certainty. Large litigation costs, however, may
cause a party to be more reluctant to settle as the litigation pro-
gresses, because settlement cannot avoid those costs once spent.
This phenomenon has caused some commentators to conclude that
the litigation process operates in a counter-intuitive manner, that is,
larger litigation costs may actually result in diminished likelihood of
settlement.228
Of course, the parties have the most information about the ex-
pected outcome after trial. 229 Once a verdict has been reached, the
parties can evaluate the probable outcome with a great deal of cer-
tainty, subject only to the variables engendered by the possibility of
reversal or reduction in the amount of a damage award.230 Such
variables entail much less uncertainty than parties' prejudgment as-
sessments, especially since the likelihood of having the case re-
versed on appeal is small.
23 1
B. The Model Refined: Collateral Consequences and the
Availability of Vacatur
The calculation described above does not account for the col-
lateral costs of a judgment, costs which the parties may incur in an
asymmetrical manner. For example, assume that a judicial finding
that D's product was defective can be used against D by subsequent
plaintiffs under the doctrine of offensive collateral estoppel. The
cost of losing this litigation must now reflect not only the cost of the
228 See, e.g., Linda R. Stanley & Don L. Coursey, Empirical Evidence on The Selection
Hypothesis and The Decision to Litigate or Settle, 19J. LEGAL STUD. 145, 163 (1990); Gordon
Tullock, Negotiated Settlement, in LAw & ECONOMICS AND THE ECONOMICS OF LEGAL REGU-
LTXON 39 (Goren Skogh &J. Malthias Graf von der Schulenburg eds. 1986).
229 The use of ADR methods, such as the summary jury trial, is premised on the
theory that, by providing litigants with sufficient information on the merits of the litiga-
tion, settlement can be achieved without the provision of a full trial. See Wayne D. Bra-
zil, What Lawyers Want From Judges in the Settlement Arena, 106 F.R.D. 85 (1985); Posner,
supra note 6. A study conducted by the American Bar Association found that 85% of the
lawyers surveyed viewed the participation ofjudges in settlement discussions as likely to
significantly improve the prospects for achieving settlement. See Brazil, supra, at 85.
This perception was no doubt based, in part, on the fact that participation by judges is
likely to result in expressions of the judge's opinions of the case-opinions which law-
yers view as most valuable in encouraging settlement. Id. at 87. Access by litigants to a
judge's opinion of the litigation allows the litigants to evaluate the prospects of success
with more accuracy, confidence, and certainty.
230 As a practical matter, a verdict may thus increase the possibility of settlement by
giving the parties a reasonably accurate description of the value of the plaintiff's claim.
Therefore, a plaintiff who steadfastly maintained that his lawsuit would result in a multi-
million dollar verdict may be more amenable to settlement overtures after the jury ren-
ders a $50,000 verdict. Similarly, a defendant who stubbornly disclaims liability during
discovery may reconsider after the trial court rejects his position.
231 See supra note 25.
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judgment in this case, but the cost of expected future judgments
(multiplied by the probability that D will be found liable). This cost
is reflected in D's calculation of expected value232 but not in P's cal-
culation, as the future litigation between D and third parties will not
affect P. Therefore, the possibility of additional plaintiffs will be a
strong inducement for D to settle and thereby avoid the risk of such
collateral effects. Indeed, D may be willing to settle in situations
where the amount he expects to pay in the instant lawsuit is quite
small, based on the risk posed by subsequent litigation.233 If, how-
ever, D has the option of buying his way out of the judgment and its
collateral effects through postjudgment settlement and vacatur, he
is unlikely to settle. 234 D will be willing to take his chances on this
lawsuit because, if he loses, a rational P would accept his tender of
the value of the judgment in return for forgoing the costs of an ap-
peal.2 35 If the court permits vacatur, D will be no worse off than if
he settled before trial at P's asking price (which D believed to be
overly high) and may be affirmatively better off if he is successful at
trial.
Vacatur thus becomes an important aspect of D's pretrial evalu-
ation of the prospects of settlement. Absent the possibility of vaca-
tur, D will be strongly inclined to settle the litigation prior to trial,
thereby avoiding the possible collateral effects of an adverse judg-
ment.23 6 If D can reasonably anticipate that the court will grant a
postjudgment motion to vacate, D may be indifferent to the timing
of the settlement or even disposed toward waiting until after trial to
232 D's formula might be adjusted to read:
V = 4' p(n)J(n) - c(t) - K(n)
where K(n) represents the collateral costs to the defendant of a particularjudgmentJ(n).
233 For example, consider the calculation if D assumes a 10% probability of liabil-
ity-damages of $50,000 in this case-but is aware that there are 100 similarly situated
plaintiffs, with potential damages totalling $5,000,000:
V(for this case) = .10(-$50,000) + .90($0) - $10,000 = -$15,000;
V(for the future cases) = .10(-$5,000,000) + .90($0) - $100,000" = -600,000.
* It is likely that the litigation costs would be substantially reduced if D were to litigate
this issue 100 times.
234 The reader may observe that this argument risks substantial overstatement of the
effect that vacatur may have on a settlement decision. The relevant inquiry, as framed
by the Nestle opinion, is not whether vacatur is likely to be a substantial factor in the
litigants' decision to settle, but rather, if vacatur is a factor, whether a rule such as the
Nestle rule actually works to encourage settlement.
235 Indeed, if the defendant tenders the full amount awarded the plaintiff, and the
plaintiff does not intend to challenge the verdict as insufficient, there is no longer a
controversy between the parties.
236 A pretrial settlement will also allow D to avoid the significant litigation costs
associated with a trial and the uncertainty of the jury verdict.
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attempt to settle, 23 7 because such a decision will not be costly.238
The foregoing analysis illustrates a fundamental flaw in the rea-
soning of the Nestle court and those who advocate routine vacatur of
judgments. Although vacatur will permit the parties to settle after
judgment in the above example, it will encourage settlement at a
much later stage in the action.23 9 Rather than encouraging settle-
ment, vacatur in fact is operating to encourage speculative litigation
because the potentially unfavorable results of litigation can be
avoided. Even where litigation at the trial level has resolved a com-
plex legal issue, the availability of vacatur encourages parties to at-
tempt to manipulate the legal system through settlement
conditioned on vacatur.
In addition, the approach of the Second Circuit in Nestle creates
a frivolous distinction between litigants who choose to file an appeal
and those who simply decide to settle or otherwise comply with the
decision of the lower court.240 Under the Second Circuit's rule,
only the former are entitled to vacatur. Litigants who "voluntarily"
give up their right to appeal are not entitled to vacatur under Sec-
237 See Memorial Hosp. v. United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 862 F.2d
1299, 1302 (7th Cir. 1988) (denying vacatur as a matter of course encourages parties to
settle prior to the district court decision).
238 Though the decision to wait until after judgment may not be particularly costly
to the defendant, delaying settlement results in real costs to both the plaintiff and soci-
ety. The plaintiff incurs legal costs in litigating at the trial level which he may never
recover. See Fiss, supra note 8, at 1076. If, for example, a plaintiff correctly perceives the
ultimatejudgment to be $100,000, but must expend $50,000 of legal costs to obtain that
judgment, he will be better off settling the case for any amount greater than $50,000.
The difference between the settlement value and the expected value after litigation rep-
resents a real gain to the plaintiff. After trial (and expenditure of the $50,000 in legal
costs), the plaintiff can no longer recoup that gain, even if he wins a $100,000 judgment.
Society loses because the court's time (of which the Second Circuit and others are so
solicitous) has already been used in arriving at the trial court judgment. In short, judi-
cial resources have been invested in this judgment. See Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d at 1302;
Fiss, supra note 8, at 1085.
239 This is particularly true in cases in which a losing party is likely to seek vacatur:
cases in which the legal or factual issues are sufficiently complex that it is difficult to
predict the outcome of the litigation, and in which there is a reasonable possibility that a
second court might not reach the same result. Such complexity complicates the parties'
calculation of the expected value of the litigation and increases the difficulty of reaching
a pretrial agreement on such a value. A pretrial settlement at a value that both parties
view as reasonable may be impossible to achieve, given the substantial differences in the
parties' expectations of the litigation outcome. Although a judgment gives the winning
plaintiff a (relatively) clear entitlement to a judgment, thus greatly enhancing the plain-
tiff's bargaining position, that entitlement may be worth far less than the plaintiff ex-
pected to obtain. Rather than serving as a floor for a subsequent settlement amount, the
verdict tends to operate, in such a case, as a ceiling.
240 Indeed, approaches like that of the Second Circuit, coupled with the CAMP'pro-
gram, may directly cause the filing of additional appeals. At least one commentator has
expressly criticized the Second Circuit's program for this reason. SeeJ. GoLDMAN, supra
note 6.
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ond Circuit law.241 Thus in Long Island Lighting Co. v. Cuomo, the
court vacated that part of the district court judgment which upheld
the LIPA Act but did not vacate the part of the judgment which de-
clared the Used and Useful Act unconstitutional. 242 According to
the court, the plaintiff was entitled to vacatur because it had rein-
stated its appeal before the case was rendered moot by settlement.
By contrast, the defendants, who had not reinstated their appeals,
lost both the decision upholding the validity of the LIPA Act and the
right to defend the Used and Useful Act against constitutional
challenge.
The reasoning in Cuomo suggests that there is a meaningful dis-
tinction between litigants which file an appeal before settlement and
those who do not. Such a distinction has no clear connection to the
Nestle court's rationale of encouraging settlement. All the court is
doing in cases like Cuomo is encouraging losing litigants to com-
mence an appeal before signing a settlement agreement. The real
result of the automatic vacatur rule is to require litigants to consume
judicial resources by initiating the appellate process in order to ac-
cess the vacatur process. As the court warned in United States v.
Garde: "We do not wish to encourage litigants who are dissatisfied
with the decision of the trial court 'to have them wiped from the
books' by merely filing an appeal, then complying with the order or
judgment below and petitioning for vacatur of the adverse trial
court decision. '243
Moreover, viewing the settlement process as a negotiation
based on expected economic consequences illustrates that the Nestle
court's concern that denying vacatur will thwart conditional settle-
ments is misplaced. If courts choose to distinguish between condi-
tional and unconditional settlements, a rational losing litigant will
always require the settlement agreement to be conditioned on vaca-
tur, a requirement that should be of no consequence to his adver-
sary. If the courts instead follow the lead of the Second Circuit 244
and grant vacatur where the settlement agreement is uncondi-
tional, 245 the courts will have no basis for determining the effect of
vacatur on the settlement process; that is, it will be impossible to
ascertain whether a case will nonetheless be settled if the court de-
241 See Blackwelder v. Safnauer, 866 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1989) (refusing to vacate dis-
trict court judgment as moot where losing litigant took no appeal).
242 888 F.2d 230, 234 n.5 (2d Cir. 1989).
243 848 F.2d 1307, 1311 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (citing Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc. v. West-
ern Conference of Teamsters, 686 F.2d 720, 721 & n.1 (9th Cir. 1982)).
244 See Cuomo, 888 F.2d at 234 (holding that it is the appellate court's "duty" to
vacate the district court judgment from which an appeal was taken).




C. Another Look at the Costs of Vacatur
Under either analysis, vacatur becomes an important bargain-
ing chip in the settlement negotiation. In addition to the normal
settlement topics such as the amount of payment, the nature of any
releases, and negotiations relating to future business dealings, the
litigants may now negotiate the subject of vacatur. In the negotia-
tion, the winning litigant is at a distinct advantage; he has little to
lose if the case is not settled and incurs no personal cost by con-
senting to vacatur. Because vacatur is very important to the other
side, his bargaining position is greatly enhanced.2 47
Indeed, a rational and informed P will perceive that the value of
postjudgment settlement is asymmetrical, i.e., D will suffer dispro-
portionately by P's refusal to settle. Consequently, P may be able to
negotiate a settlement which is higher than the expected outcome,
based on his awareness of D's need to avoid the collateral conse-
quences of the judgment.2 48 This additional value to P is a windfall
which reflects the value to D of avoiding the collateral consequences
of the judgment. If one assumes that the collateral consequences
are not only an inconvenience to D but also an affirmative benefit to
society, P has appropriated part of the societal value of the judg-
ment for his personal gain.
2 49
This raises an additional issue: if the public loses when a final
judgment is vacated after settlement, who gains? Cases such as Nes-
tle suggest that the availability of vacatur creates a societal gain in
the increased number of settlements. As the foregoing analysis has
demonstrated, vacatur does not encourage settlement; if anything, it
discourages it by allowing a party to gamble on two rolls of the dice
at the cost of one. By allowing a litigant to erase the adverse effect
of a trial, vacatur encourages even the settlement-inclined litigant to
246 Conversely, the courts will be granting vacatur in cases where it is manifestly
unnecessary to obtain a settlement.
247 One of the problems with settlement as a means of resolving disputes is the pos-
sibility that settlement may be coerced by the party with greater access to information or
resources. In addition, to the extent that a party's willingness to settle is a function of
the resources available to that party, the coerciveness of the settlement process contin-
ues to be a factor after a trial courtjudgment. A poor plaintiff who has been successful
at trial may be unwilling to fund a defense of that judgment or to hold out through the
appellate process before receiving payment. See Fiss, supra note 8, at 1075-76.
248 See supra notes 232-33.
249 See Village Escrow v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 202 Cal. App. 3d 1309, 248
Cal. Rptr. 687, 696 (1988) (losing litigant offered prevailing party substantial amount of
money to settle case, coupled with "an express threat that the prevailing party would
lose the promised money if this court filed an opinion").
1991] 639
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
wait until after trial.250
The beneficiaries of the system are actually both of the original
parties. The losing party gains by achieving control over the litiga-
tion process; the winning party gains an opportunity to appropriate
part of the societal value of final judgments for its own benefit. But
the vacatur process is, at best, a zero sum game.251 If both the par-
ties to the vacatur decision gain, the public loses.
The foregoing analysis compels the conclusion that the decision
to vacate should not be left to individual litigants. Although the de-
cision to litigate may be a private one, the litigants are in an unusu-
ally poor position to safeguard the integrity of the system. Examine
again the original losing litigant with his three choices of paying the
adverse judgment, pursuing an appeal, or seeking a settlement. The
litigant's private assessment of the choices should lead the litigant to
negotiate a settlement in almost every case. If the adverse judgment
entails significant collateral costs which may be avoided by vacatur,
the litigant will choose to condition that settlement on vacatur. The
losing litigant has no incentive to defend the integrity of ajudgment
which he has lost, yet, he has everything to gain by erasing that ad-
verse decision.
Moreover, his adversary, the prevailing party, is a poor de-
fender of the judgment because he will be able to obtain a higher
overall outcome by settlement whenever his opponent places a high
value on vacatur. Through the postjudgment settlement process,
the prevailing party is able to make use of the judicial decision as if it
were his own private property. 252 If a prevailing party can accu-
rately identify adverse impacts of a judgment on the opponent in
addition to the actual verdict, those impacts become part of that
party's overall calculus of settlement.
250 See id (refusing to permit litigants to settle after oral argument conditioned on
the court's agreement not to publish an opinion). The court in Village Escrow explained
its refusal as follows:
For, it would send a message to other appellants and respondents that
they can wait until oral argument and, if they sense the probability or
possibility the appellate court will rule against them, buy their way out of
an unfavorable precedent often at the relatively cheap price asked by the
single opponent they face in that appeal.
Id.
251 Some may argue that the decision to settle after judgment must, perforce, result
in societal losses. Cf. Fiss, supra note 8, at 1089 (inherent conflict between viewing adju-
dication in private terms and public terms). No matter how the costs of vacatur are
distributed among society and the individual litigants, one cost that can never be repaid
is the value of the judicial resources consumed in arriving at the initial judgment. These
resources are already expended and cannot be saved by a postjudgment settlement. See
Kates & Barker, supra note 207, at 1433-35. Thus, society's stake in the vacatur decision
can be tied to the societal investment in obtaining the initial judgment.
252 See Memorial Hosp. v. United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 862 F.2d
1299, 1302 (7th Cir. 1988).
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To illustrate, suppose that Nestle could pursue its toll house
litigation against ten different defendants and, if pursued indepen-
dently, the odds of winning were 40%o. A successful defendant
could conceivably hold Nestle hostage to the tune of approximately
40% of the expected damages, minus litigation costs, for agreeing
to vacate an adverse decision. The first winning plaintiff appropri-
ates the public benefit-the cost savings of forgoing the subsequent
nine litigations.
This analysis reveals an additional insight. Rather than being a
helpless captive to the other side's demands for vacatur in the
postjudgment settlement negotiation, as suggested by the Nestle
court, a prevailing litigant may be the beneficiary of the bargaining
advantage afforded not simply by his win, but by the additional costs
the judgment imposes on the other side. A well-informed litigant
should be able to negotiate a higher postjudgment settlement if he
agrees to vacatur as a condition of settlement.
CONCLUSION
Allowing vacatur to be resolved by settlement negotiation be-
tween the parties imposes tangible but frequently undetectable so-
cial costs. These costs include the public cost of forgoing the
collateral estoppel and res judicata effects of the prior judgment.
This cost is borne directly by third party litigants but shared by the
public interest in preventing duplicative and piecemeal litigation.
The costs also include the erasure of collateral consequences of an
adverse judgment, the loss of precedential value for judicial deci-
sions, and a diminished respect for the judicial process.
253
Moreover, rather than encouraging the settlement process, aju-
dicial rule encouraging routine grants of vacatur disrupts the pro-
cess. A procedure which allows parties to obtain vacatur as a matter
of right by conditioning a postjudgment settlement on vacatur will
encourage parties to delay settlement until after trial because the
effects of an adverse judgment can be avoided at little or no cost by
postjudgment settlement. The procedure will also permit the pre-
vailing party to obtain as a private windfall the public costs of vaca-
tur, and will place the defense of the integrity ofjudicial decisions in
253 The Village Escrow court recognized the substantial social cost inherent in permit-
ting litigants to buy their way out of unfavorable decisions. "[I]t could even distort the
law by allowing parties who possess ample means to prevent the filing of adverse prece-
dents while those without means are unable to do so." Village Escrow, 248 Cal. Rptr. at
696. The implication of this distortion is particularly acute in cases in which an institu-
tional defendant repeatedly litigates similar claims against individual plaintiffs, such as
cases in the mass tort/products liability area.
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the hands of litigants who are not in a position to safeguard the pub-
lic values inherent therein.
Accordingly, the settlement of a case pending appeal should
not entitle the litigants to vacatur as a matter of right. Rather, the
courts should review motions to vacate with the presumption that
vacatur is not an appropriate tool for erasing an unfavorable trial
court decision. The standard motion to vacate after a postjudgment
settlement, motivated solely by the losing party's desire to avoid the
collateral consequences of that judgment, should be routinely de-
nied. Though the litigants should retain the opportunity to per-
suade the court that there is particular prejudice in an individual
case, such as the unfairness presented by the Munsingwear doctrine,
the litigants should bear the burden of convincing the court that this
dilemma is not of their own making. Absent such a showing, the
judgment in a case which has been resolved through settlement
should enjoy the same vitality as that in any other case in which the
losing litigant chooses not to appeal.
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